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I. INTRODUCTION
From the end of World War II until the late 1970s, the United
States was the undisputed leader in international commerce. It was
the number one creditor nation in the world and exported its goods all
over the globe without having to worry unduly about competition.
This rosy picture lulled American business into a comfortable somno-
lence as it seemed that the United States could sell its goods no matter
what the quality or conditions of sale, without having to make much of
an effort.
The world has changed radically in the last fifteen years or so. To-
day, we are no longer the number one creditor nation; at least not by
several yardsticks of economic productivity. Our economic supremacy
is no longer within easy reach, largely due to the unrelenting competi-
tion by the very same nations which we helped to restore to a sound
economic basis after World War II and which may have learned only
too well from our teachings. We are now the number one debtor na-
tion in the world. Among the industrialized nations, we have slipped
several steps from number one in terms of quality of life, including
social and economic growth.'
It has taken American business an inordinate amount of time to
1. According to David M. Gordon, professor of economics at the New School of So-
cial Research in New York, the United States economy is sliding rapidly into
Third World status. David G. Gordon, Times Board of Economists: U.S. Sliding
To Third World Status, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8,1991, § D (Business), at 2, col. 1. Pro-
fessor Gordon bases his conclusion on the following seven features of the U.S.
economy- "Dramatically increasing inequalities in income and wealth; [c]hronic
foreign trade deficits (with heavy reliance on agricultural and raw materials ex-
ports); [sitagnant productivity growth; [v]ast surplus pools of low-wage and rela-
tively unskilled workers; [t]he existence of a large underclass with few regular
ties to the formal market economy; [r]elatively high rates of infant mortality, and
... phlegmatic or declining popular participation in... political process." Id. See
also USA TODAY, July 10, 1991, § B (Money), at 4 (reporting that the United
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adjust to the new world conditions and to actively seek the export
business instead of expecting to be sought after. For example, the
auto-makers in Detroit refused for twenty years to see the writing on
the wall: quality finally emerged as the predominant factor in the sale
of automobiles.2 Today, one of the disturbing factors is a difficult-to-
overcome perception by consumers that the quality of American goods
has slipped to the status of Japanese pre-World War II "junk" goods;
the difference being that our "junk" is expensive while Japan's pre-
war "junk" was cheap.
This article will focus on the text of the new French Competition
law of December 1, 1986, then broadly will compare its provisions with
the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome which cre-
ated the European Economic Community (EEC). In turn, this article
will then examine the post-1992 United European role in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), given the very powerful
French agricultural interests, as well as many other national vested
interests. Will a united position by the EEC (the European partners
whose negotiators are involved in the currently stalled Uruguay
Round) have a negative impact on GATT and, accordingly, on adverse
influence the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States? Can we
come forth with cooperative arrangements between the EEC and the
U.S. for the export of agricultural products, meat and other foods?
What will happen with Intellectual Property rights or the transfer of
technology which may constitute one of the largest business factors of
the developed world in the years to come? Finally, should we envision
a major role for the arbitral tribunal provided for in GATT and con-
templated by the original ITO (International Trade Organization), es-
tablished in Havana in 1947?3
States was the only major industrialized nation to suffer a drop in its standard of
living in 1990).
As foreign economies grew and started exporting to the U.S., putting a pre-
mium on quality and economy, American domestic product consumption went
down. The U.S. must compete within its own market and should have done a
better job of "conquering" foreign markets. As long as basic production remained
in the U.S., the country offered a large enough market to keep productivity and
income indexes high. As business kept pushing production of basic goods of the
U.S. to foreign countries, which created unemployment and lower-salary "ser-
vice" positions, American businesses were not prepared to aggressively seek "ex-
ports" as an outlet for manufactured goods.
2. See, for example, recent GM, Ford and Chrysler ads stressing quality and safety,
if not economy. E.g., NEwswEEK, Nov. 11, 1991, inside cover (Chrysler advertise-
ment emphasizing quality, safety and economy!).
3. The so-called Havana Charter was not implemented as a result of the "iron cur-
tain" descending on the Soviet empire and its satellites in 1948.
Prior to ITO, the dispute resolution mechanisms of trade agreements prior to
World War II provided only a limited remedy-the right to convene formal nego-
tiations with the other party. With the hoped-for advent of ITO, a decision-mak-
ing body was to be implemented which had the power to make third-party
1992]
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This is a modest contribution made to provide an understanding of
at least one key European line of economic thinking.4 This article also
suggests how America may benefit if it takes to heart the lessons
demonstrated and heeds the warning signs that are all too apparent
including the comments and advice over the past several years of
many American thinkers in and out of academia.
I have chosen France as the subject for this article. It serves as an
example of a powerful European nation breaking out of the political
constraints of a totally managed economy created as a result of the
World War II cataclysm. France has since progressively embraced a
form of managed free market, and adopted the 1985 Law on Competi-
tion,5 now supplanted by the Order of December 1, 1986, which com-
mits France to the adoption of a free market economy consistent with
the objectives of the European Community.
II. THE NEW FRENCH LAW ON COMPETITION
This section provides comments and analysis of the Decree of De-
cember 1, 1986.6
determinations on the merits of a nullification claim. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE
GATI LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 37 (2d ed. 1990). See ITO
CHARTER, Ch. VII, contained in E/conf. 2/78 (Mar. 24,1948). The text of the ITO
Charter is reprinted as U.N. Doe. ICITO/1/4 (1948), and may be located in U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 3206, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIEs 114 (1948).
4. I take it upon myself to dispense with most footnotes except those that identify a
direct quote or those which are necessary to identify a particularly important case
or a supporting source relating to this survey. Little, if anything, is all that origi-
nal in most contemporary writings about a subject as lively as this one. See, Har-
old M. White, Jr., The Private Law of Space An Evolutionary Imperative, in HI
AMERICAN ENTERPmis--THE LAW, AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE 3 (1986)
citing with approval, Rodolphe de Seife, Star War or Star Peace: The Impact of
International Treaties on the Commercial Use of Space, in I AMERCAN ENTER-
PRIsFE--THE LAw, AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE 73 (1986).
Be that as it may, I remain convinced that citing scores of authors for every
proposition, many of which may be in the public domain of international legal
thinking, ignores the fact that these authors, in turn, rely on dozens of other
scholars sharing in the common market of intellectual inquiry in this most dy-
namic field.
I have, instead, chosen to append to this article a fairly voluminous bibliogra-
phy from which has been culled much of what is expressed herein. A fair amount
is also based on my own observations and experience in the private international
law practice for over three decades, both in Washington and in Paris.
Finally, while I take responsibility for any failings, omissions and errors in
this article, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues, Profes-
sor A. Samuel Oddi, for his thoughtful comments in the area of intellectual prop-
erty problems, and Professor Joel Swift for his support. The contribution of my
student research assistants, Steve Katz, L3, and particularly, Gregory A. Brown,
L2, is acknowledged. I would be remiss not to mention Ms. Judy Fredholm and
Ms. Jenny Oleson, our faculty secretaries, for their generous cooperation.
5. 1985 J.O. (L) 7855.
6. This part of the article is primarily based on a memorandum entitled "Comments
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A. Historical Overview
The French Revolutionary Government proclaimed the freedom of
commerce and industry by the Act of 1791. During the same period,
citizens engaging in like commercial activities were forbidden to unite
to protect their common economic interests. This put an effective end
to the Guild system which had controlled production and trade since
the Middle Ages. A few years later, Article 419 of the Napoleonic Pe-
nal Code of 1810 made it a crime to promote "the rise or fall of the
price of goods or merchandise or of public securities above or below
the price which the natural and free course of competition would
determine."
The modern basic philosophy of French economic regulation was
outlined in the Decrees of June 30, 1945. 7 These Decrees, amended at
least 25 times since their introduction, addressed specific preoccupa-
tions brought about by the horrendous destruction wrought by World
War II and the German Occupation.
Price Ordinance No. 45-1483, issued June 30, 1945, set up a compre-
hensive system of price controls. Antitrust legislation was not enacted
at that time. Rather, such legislation was introduced in 1953 and
promulgated by Decree of the Government amending Price Ordinance
No. 45-1483. However, in 1958 the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State)
judged the decree to be ultra vires and therefore null. Nonetheless,
the 1953 Decree was reenacted by the government under the basic
powers conferred to it by the then existing Constitution.
The amended Price Ordinance dealt, among other things, with re-
strictive practices. Articles concerning such practices included: Arti-
cle 37(1)(a), prohibiting refusal to sell; Article 37(1)(c), prohibiting
tying practices; Article 37(4), prohibiting resale price maintenance;
and Articles 50 and 51, prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and
abuses of dominant position. In addition, Title II of Act No. 77-806
provided for a mechanism of merger control by authorizing the Minis-
ter of the Economy to proceed against "concentrations," meaning
mergers and acquisitions "which would prevent competition in the
market."
For a number of years it became evident, at least from the indus-
try's viewpoint, that a general rewriting of these rules was required to
and Analysis of the Dec. 1,1986 Decree" by my dear friend and colleague, the late
Me. Claude Lebel and his associate, Me. Marc Saint-Cene. Both are members of
the Paris Bar. Much of the analysis of the 1986 Decree is a liberal translation of
this monograph published in 1988 by the firm of Cotirtois, Bouloy, Lebel & Asso-
ciates of Paris, France. Some of the thoughts were also discussed by Me. Lebel
with me the year before his untimely demise. I take full responsibility for all
errors herein.
7. Jacques Azema, La De pelisation Du Droit De La Concurrence, 4 REv. Sci.
CRm. 651 (1989).
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bring French law on competition in agreement with modem economic
thinking. Eventually, legislation on the "transparency of charges" was
added to the body of competition rules in existence up to 1985:8
1. The Act of July 1, 1985 provided that financial institutions would be
subject to the same rules as other economic undertakings. It also
amended Article 89 of the Act No. 84-46 of January 24, 1984 which
gave the Banking Commission jurisdiction to establish the exist-
ence of unlawful agreements attributable to financial institutions
and impose appropriate penalties.
2. Act No. 84-937 of October 23, 1984 provided for limits to industry
concentration and established rules to "ensure the financial trans-
parency and pluralism of newspaper publishing houses." A Com-
mission on Press Transparency and Pluralism was to be
"responsible for implementing the Act and for the imposition of
penalties ......
3. The Circular of May 22, 1984 established, by way of commentaries
on the provisions of the Act of December 27, 1973, guidelines for the
retail trades and craft industries relating to discrimination and re-
strictive charges. This was a response to the inter-trade agreements
reached between producers and distributors in 1983.
Previously, the French Parliament had enacted Article 1 of Act No.
63-628 of July 2, 1963, forbidding loss-leader sales.
Section 37 of La Loi Royer (the "Royer Act"), also known as Act
No. 73-1193 of December 27, 1973, which aimed to protect small busi-
nesses, strengthened the prohibition against discriminatory pricing
practices previously contained in Section 37 of Price Ordinance No. 45-
1483. This section outlawed "direct or indirect price discrimination
and [made] it an offense for buyers to seek, or knowingly accept, dis-
criminatory pricing advantages."
Act No. 77-806 of July 19, 1977 set forth the procedures to be fol-
lowed by the Competition Commission and the Minister of Economics.
It gave them initial jurisdiction to oversee agreements reached be-
tween producers and distributors. Additionally, it created an Arbitra-
tion Board, made up of practitioners, to settle disputes.
Liberal reform has finally come to pass in France! The result is a
set of substantial modifications which affect institutional structures
and change the legal rules of competition and the sanctions penalizing
their infraction.
Will the new French effort, in harmonizing its law on competition
with the rules of the European community, have an impact on Euro-
pean Community trade policy in restoring France to its aspired leader-
8. Much of this historical overview of French antitrust law has been culled from
Robert Plaisant and Pierre Rosen's excellent overview of French anticompetitive
law published in 1980 with the assistance of Vincent Joris. See ROBERT PLAISANT
& PIERRE ROSEN, WORLD LAW OF CoMPErITION (1984 ed. & Supp. 1987).
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ship position? In a broader sense, will French economic thinking
influence the world economy due to the positions likely to be taken by
European negotiators during various future GATT discussions?
Never before has it been more important for Americans to realize
that the world is, in fact, a global village. We must actively participate
in the running of that village lest it be run in a manner which is not to
our pleasing, as many have predicted over the past several decades.
B. The Decree of December 1, 1986
The new decree/order 9 (hereinafter the "Decree") is not a com-
plete code of competition law since it was impossible to achieve a com-
plete synthesis of the law in the short time period allotted to the
experts. A brief overview of the key points of Decree #86-1309 of
December 29, 1986 is as follows:
The heading of the first section of the Decree reads "The Freedom
of Pricing." The Decree Order #45-1483 of June 30, 1945 which re-
lated to pricing is abrogated. In its stead, the new Decree states that
the basic economic principle of any free society is that "prices are
freely determined by the interplay of competition."
Decades of state interventionism no doubt required that the
French be reminded of a rule which its economic operators had never
forgotten or ignored. In any event, even the bureaucrats whose job it
was to supervise the activities of the economic operators were often
constrained, against their own convictions, to apply texts which they
knew to be unrealistic. The fact that, apparently, reason has finally
triumphed over inertia should be applauded.
This general rule of freedom, however, is limited by two excep-
tions. The first exception, possibly a permanent one, is that the gov-
ernment may regulate prices each time when, in a sector or geographic
zone, competition is limited because of monopoly, endemic difficulties
of restocking, or by law. The Decree preserves the continued regula-
tion of taxicabs, electricity, gas, pharmaceutical products and books.
The second exception provides for government intervention when the
economy is affected by a crisis, exceptional circumstances, a public dis-
aster or a totally abnormal situation of the market in any particular
sector. Since, under French law the government can, at any moment,
modify all existing legislative enactments in order to protect the pub-
lic interest, it might not have been necessary to provide for these
exceptions.
Title II of the DecreelO creates a new agency, the Council on Com-
petition. The original draft of the new Decree defined this Council as
9. Ordinance 86-1243 of Dec. 1, 1986. Published, 1986 J.O. (L); followed by Decree
No. 86-1309 of Dec. 29, 1986.
10. Jean Donnedieu de Vabres, Les Institutions C/argees De La Mise En Oeuvre Du
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an independent "authority." This definition, which existed already in
the law of December 30, 1985, has since disappeared from the text.
The decision of the French Constitutional Council, dated January 23,
1987, declared that the Council on Competition is of a "non-jurisdic-
tional" nature. The composition of the Competition Council and its
rules of operation show the intent of the Decree's authors to guaran-
tee its independence, to strengthen its consultative role to the govern-
ment and to insure its authority.
Title III of the Decree is entitled "Of Anticompetitive Practices."
Decree 86-1243 of December 1, 1986 distinguishes collective from indi-
vidual practices and readopts the important innovation contained in
the reform of December 30, 1985: the abusive exploitation of "eco-
nomic dependence."" Equally innovative is the decriminalization of
certain individual practices such as unjustified discriminatory condi-
tions of sale or purchase, the unjustified refusal to sell, and tie-in
sales.12
By virtue of basic legal principles of French law, the matters cur-
rently on the dockets should be nonsuited by the extinction of the
public action since the victims in these cases have recourse to the ap-
propriate civil or commercial jurisdictions. Complaints not yet acted
upon as of the time of the Decree's effectiveness should, therefore, be
rejected by a refusal to indict.
A substantive innovation of import is the awarding of oversight ju-
risdiction to the courts, as guardians of the citizens' freedoms, over the
investigatory actions of government agents. However, the Council on
Competition retains the power to stop violations and impose economic
sanctions when necessary.
The initial draft of the Decree provided for an appellate procedure
Droit De La Concurrence: Le Conseil De La Concurrence, 5 JOURxtES FRANCO-
ALLEmANDES 521 (1989).
11. A similar concept was articulated by Justice Murphy in his majority opinion in
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). According to the Court, an
unreasonable restraint on trade "may result ... from a conspiracy among those
who are affiliated or integrated under common ownership .... The corporate
interrelationships of the conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of
the applicability of the Sherman Act. The statute is aimed at substance rather
than form." Id. at 227. Despite the logic of this opinion, Yellow Cab was recently
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984)(holding the so-called "intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine insufficient
grounds to establish a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
Economic dependence was also espoused as the theory for violation of U.S.
antitrust law in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978)(en
banc), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978), wherein Sears, Roebuck & Co. was ac-
cused of manipulating its distributors by way of large scale exclusive dealing ar-
rangements. However, a jury verdict for Oreck was reversed 6-2 by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
12. Azema, supra note 7.
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before the Court of Appeals in Paris to review the Council on Compe-
tition's "decisions." However, the Council of State'3 opposed such con-
trol over a decision of an administrative "authority" by a judicial
magistrate. Accordingly, the draft was then amended to provide that
the decisions of the Council on Competition would be subject to an
appeal to the Council of State. The text of the law, nevertheless, re-
adopted the procedural system originally proposed by the experts, but
Parliament referred the matter to the Constitutional Council for a
ruling on its constitutionality.
It should be noted that the Council of State, in issuing its decision
of annulment based on the ultra vires reach of the Decree of October
25, 1977 relating to the previous Commission on Competition, stated:
Considering that it results from the preceding that the Commission on Com-
petition has the character of an administrative agency[j] the organizational
and operational rules of which do not flow from the judicial power as claimed
erroneously by those requesting resort to the "penal procedure" of Article 34
of Constitution, but, as a matter of principle, flow from the regulatory power
by virtue of Article 37.14
However, it is not on that issue that the Constitutional Council voided
the transfer of litigation involving decisions of the Commission on
Competition to the Court of Appeals in Paris. Rather, it made this
decision because the right for an individual to request and obtain a
deferment of the implementation of the decision appealed from consti-
tutes a basic guarantee of the rights of defense, and this opportunity
was being denied by the proposed recourse to the Court of Appeals.
Title IV deals with piercing the corporate veil and anticompetitive
practices. Title V deals with economic concentration. Title VI covers
investigatory measures, and the last title, entitled "Miscellaneous Pro-
visions," contains an enumeration of previous amended or abrogated
texts and provides that the Council of State will determine the terms
of the applicability of this Decree.
III. THE COUNCIL ON COMPETITION
A. Membership
The former "Commission" on Competition was chaired by a mem-
ber of the Council of State having at least the rank of Counsellor of
State, a member of the Supreme Court, or a member of the Court of
Claims having at least the rank of Master Counsellor. In addition, the
Commission had five members drawn from the Council of State, the
Court of Claims or the Judiciary, six members chosen because of their
professional competence and two members appointed because of their
economic expertise. The fourteen Commission members were named
13. Conseil d'Etat, Le., the French Administrative Law Supreme Court.
14. Lebon 136 (1981).
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for a renewable term of five years. The Decree of November 23, 1968
did not significantly change this membership which had been in force
since January 27, 1954.
The new legislation, however, provides that the "Council" on Com-
petition have sixteen members. Seven are to be chosen from among
the highest judicial and administrative officers. Four members should
be outstanding experts on economic matters or specialists in the area
of competition and consumer protection. The remaining five should
be professionals who are currently active or who have had extensive
experience in the area of production, delivery of services, or the liberal
professions, or be from the ranks of artisans. The Government names
a Commissioner who is to state the official governmental position to
the Council. He is appointed by the Economics Minister.
B. Operation
The standard operating procedure consists of rules on the meetings
of the Council on Competition, its jurisdiction, its investigations and
its deliberations. By virtue of Article 4, the Council may sit in plenary
session, either by panels or by permanent committee (commission), it
being chaired by a president and two vice-presidents. The President of
the Council on Competition decides (Article 22) which matter will be
brought before the permanent committee without a prior report.
Before the expiration of two weeks from the time of notice, the parties
may ask that the matter be submitted to the Council.
In regard to the jurisdictional scope of the Council on Competition,
the old "Commission" had jurisdiction by virtue of its office, was given
jurisdiction by the Minister of Economics and Finances, or had juris-
diction resulting from an inquiry or judicial action. The law of July 19,
1977 added to the above methods of acquiring jurisdiction the option
for territorial collectives, professional organizations, syndicates, and
consumer organizations-approved in accordance with the provisions
of Article 46 of the law of December 27, 1973-to invest jurisdiction in
the Council. The Prime Minister could also invest the Council with
jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Article 8 in Decree No. 77-
1189 of October 25, 1977. Article 8 provided that the Economics Minis-
ter or the Minister in charge of a particular economic sector could, by
virtue of the provisions of Article 10 of the Decree of July 19, 1977,
give the Council on Competition jurisdiction over any scheme, action
or activity, involving economic concentration.
Thus, while the Council on Competition (Article 11) may be called
upon by the Minister of the Economy to act in specific matters, it may
also assert jurisdiction ex officio. Additionally, the Council can ac-
quire jurisdiction by request from the undertakings, territorial collec-
tives, professional or labor organizations, approved consumer
[Vol. 71:488
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organizations, the Chamber of Agriculture, the Chamber of Crafts or
the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
Article 16 of the Decree of December 26, 1986 provides that the
Council must report to those Administrative authorities named in the
appendix to the Decree any jurisdiction asserted within their area of
competence. The Council, however, cannot assert jurisdiction over
matters which date back more than three years if no official action has
been taken tending to result in an inquiry or findings, or the imposi-
tion of sanctions with regard to such activities (Article 27).
C. Advisory Powers
The Council on Competition has advisory powers which, depending
on the case, are optional or mandatory. It is charged with the evalua-
tion of the impact of legislative and regulatory texts on competition.
The Council may issue recommendations in advance of the issuance of
such texts, in order to reduce any negative effect on competition that
might result from their adoption.
1. The Optional Consultation
Article 5 provides that the government and parliamentary commit-
tees may seek the advice of the Council on Competition regarding any
question relating to competition, and more generally, on any legisla-
tive proposal, insofar as it concerns the committees. The Council may
also be seized of any matter upon the request of an independent ad-
ministrative agency, territorial collective, professional or labor organi-
zation, approved consumer organization, or the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. Finally, Article 26 of the Decree outlines the
option of civil, commercial or penal jurisdictions or administrative
agencies to ask for the advice of the Council. Any advice given pursu-
ant to these directives may not be published until after a decision of
exoneration has been handed down or a judgment on the substantive
issue has been issued.
It is useful to note that in a case before the Correctional Tribunal
of Paris, the expression "anticompetitive practice" has been defined as
aiming only at those infractions to the legislation relating to anticom-
petitive agreements and dominant positions.1 5 Article 26, which im-
plicitly incorporates this definition, applies to such consultation only
with respect to Articles 7 and 8 exclusively.
2. The Mandatory Consultation
The Council on Competition must be consulted by the government
15. Trib. Gr. Inst., Paris, Nov. 12, 1979; G.P. Jan. 30, 1980.
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on all legislative or regulatory proposals concerning the following
three areas:
-subjecting the exercise of a profession or access to a market to
quantitative restrictions;
-establishing exclusive rights in certain zones of economic activ-
ity; and
-imposing uniform pricing or conditions of sale practices.
The clearance must be requested in advance and is mandatory in the
case of any decree proclaiming exemptions by categories (Article 10).
D. The Council's Jurisdiction Over Anticompetitive Practices
The new Decree reinvokes the prohibition of Article 50 of the law
of July 14, 1977 regarding agreements and activities of an undertaking
or group of undertakings, having a dominant market position, when
these activities have the objective or effect of interfering with the nor-
mal functioning of the market. The law has added another prohibition
involving "[t]he abusive exploitation of the state of economic depen-
dence in which a supplying or purchasing entity finds itself when it
does not have an equivalent solution at its disposal." This notion ap-
peared in French economic law at the time of the issuance of the law
of December 30, 1985. It was not defined then and the new Decree
does not define it either. This task has, therefore, been left to case
law.16
1. Investigation in Cases of Anticompetitive Practices
a. Normal Procedure
Article 19 states that "[t]he Council, first of all, may declare the
unsuitability of the forum upon motion if it finds that the facts stated
do not come within its competence or are not sufficiently backed by
relevant evidence." The previous text did not contain any such provi-
sion. It does not appear that this finding of lack of jurisdiction is
appealable.
A second possibility, also provided for in the Decree, is the refusal
to continue the prosecution of a case. The substance of Article 20 cov-
ers a situation that is different from the one anticipated by Article 19.
In such a case, it may be that neither of the conditions which lead to a
finding of lack of jurisdiction is satisfied, but the Council may never-
theless decide that there is no reason to pursue the matter.
Let us assume that the Council has been informed of a matter or
has, on its own initiative, taken this matter up. Several scenarios may
arise:
a) If the facts appear to the Council to be of such a nature as to
16. Id
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justify the application of Article 17, it forwards the file to the Prosecu-
tor of the Republic. This tolls the Statute of Limitations.
The second sentence of Article 419 of the Penal Code is abolished.
As a consequence, any penal infraction covered by the ordinance will
trigger the opening of an inquiry.
b) In an emergency, the Council on Competition has the power to
take injunctive measures, but only if the practice complained of has a
serious and immediate impact on the general economy, the economy
of a special sector, the interest of consumers, or the complaining un-
dertaking. The Council's decision may provide for the suspension of
the particular practice as well as an injunction to the parties to return
to the status quo ante (Article 12). Such injunctions may be enforced
by pecuniary sanctions.
c) Without waiving the emergency measures, the Council brings
the complaint to the attention of the interested parties (Article 21) as
well as the government Commissioner.
In such a case, the parties have two months (instead of one month)
to present their comments. The report is then sent to the parties, the
government Commissioner and the interested Ministers. Another two
months' extension is then given to the parties to present a brief which
the Council must study within the fifteen days preceding the hearing.
The hearing is not public. Only the parties and the government
Commissioner may attend. The parties may ask for a hearing by the
Council. They may be represented or assisted by counsel.
Unfortunately, the text specifies that the General Rapporteur and
the Rapporteur may be present at the deliberations, albeit without any
participatory voice, even though the procedure is termed "fully adver-
sarial." One of two things will happen. Either the Rapporteurs will
be present but silent, in which case their presence is useless, or the
General Rapporteur and the Rapporteur will bring to the Council, at a
critical time of its most important deliberations prior to its decision,
elements of a decisive weight without the other parties having had an
opportunity to discuss their relevance or even know of their existence.
The latter case is a derogation of the principle of the "fully" adver-
sarial character of the procedure and an attempt to diminish the rights
of the defense. Nonetheless, it is otherwise quite clearly improved
when compared to the previous procedure.
b. Simplified Procedure
The simplified procedure was provided for by Article 55 of the law
of July 19, 1977. Under the previous law, the parties had the option of
asking for a remand before the Commission in order to let the case
follow the normal procedure. The normal procedure itself had been
the object of many judicial decisions. However, defendants did not use
that opportunity since the maximum penalty provided for in the sim-
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plified procedure was lower than the risks resulting from the normal
procedure. The new procedure provided for in Article 22 of the new
law raises the same problems.
The maximum pecuniary fine, initially set at 100,000 French
Francs and then 200,000 French Francs by the provisions of Article 86
of Law No. 80-30 of January 18, 1980, is now 500,000 Francs. Thus, it is
not very likely that the parties will choose the option offered them by
the Ordinance and, thus, ask that the matter be sent back to the Coun-
cil on Competition by invoking application of the normal procedure.
2. Deliberations and Decisions of the Commission
The Council deliberates in plenary hearing, either by one of the
panels or by the permanent Committee. However, the Ordinance did
not specify the quorum needed for a valid plenary session or a panel.
This is now specified in Article 5 of the Decree. Decisions are arrived
at on a majority basis. In the case of a tie, the chairperson of the par-
ticular meeting will cast the decisive vote.
During a hearing, the Council may hear any person whose testi-
mony would add to the inquiry (Article 25). At its conclusion, the
Commission issues sanctions and injunctions (Article H), refers the
matter to the Public Prosecutor, or takes conservatory measures (see
above). These decisions are eventually published in the Official Bulle-
tin on Competition, Consumer Protection and Fraud Prevention.
The Council may order an end to any anticompetitive practices
complained of within a specific time frame or impose other special
conditions. It may also impose monetary fines if the injunctions are
not obeyed. The Permanent Committee makes the finding that the
Council's injunctions have not been obeyed (second sentence, Article
13).
The maximum sanction for an undertaking, as specified in the
third clause of Article 13, is five percent of the gross income, exclusive
of taxes, earned in France during the last closed financial year. If the
offender is not an undertaking, the maximum is 10 million Francs.
The decision is then sent to all interested parties and the appropriate
Minister. The time for appeal is two months. However, the appeal
does not toll the course of the action.
It is to be noted that the "Commission" on Competition gives ad-
vice, while the "Council" "orders", "imposes fines," "issues and spells
out injunctions." It does not, however, "condemn."
E. The Council's Jurisdiction in Matters Involving Economic
Concentration
The law of July 19, 1977 created a control mechanism over eco-
nomic concentration. The word "control" was not in the law, but the
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definition of what could be "monitored concentration" constituted a
very broad umbrella covering different situations.
Article 39 of the Ordinance adopts, with one minor modification,
the text of Article 4 of the law which it replaced. The circular of Feb-
ruary 14, 1978 even specified that certain franchising or licensing oper-
ations and exclusive distribution contracts could be subjected to
monitoring. The new text does not provide these specific details, but
one should remember the provisions of the previous texts.
With respect to the monitoring of concentrations, the ordinance
has adopted the same procedure provided for in the previous law. This
procedure provides for the voluntary notification to the government of
concentrations or plans of concentration.
It is important to note seriatim:
-the conditions of control;
-the procedure of notification.
1. The Market
The concentration which may be subject to monitoring is only that
which affects the domestic market.
2. The Limitations
The prior law provided two assumptions for control. It could be
exercised only if the business volume in the domestic market by the
suspected undertaking during the calendar year preceding the concen-
tration was in excess of:
(a) for the totality of the undertakings, forty percent of the na-
tional market involving goods, products or services of the same or sub-
stitutable nature; or
(b) for at least two of the contracting parties or groups of affected
undertakings, and for each one of them, twenty-five percent of the
national consumption of goods, products or services which cannot be
substituted.
The new floors referred to above apply when two factors are
present:
(a) More than twenty-five percent of the sales, purchases, or other
transactions in the domestic market of goods, products or substitut-
able services, or a substantial portion of such a market have a total
exceeding 7 billion francs of business (net of taxes); and
(b) at least two of the undertakings which are parties to the con-
centration have had a business volume totaling at least 2 billion francs
(net of taxes).
The notion of non-substitutable goods has thus been replaced by
the size of the undertakings as shown by their sales volume. Article 27
of the Decree specifies that the business volume which is taken into
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account, in order to apply Article 38, is the one that is achieved in the
domestic market by the undertakings involved and is understood to be
the difference between the global business volume before taxes of
each of the enterprises and the accounting value of their direct ex-
ports, or those made through agents, to foreign countries.
One of two things must occur. Either the floor is not reached, and
notification is not necessary, or the floor is reached and the parties
have the choice to notify or to not notify. The procedure for notifica-
tion consists of five events.
1. Notice is given to the Minister of the Economy by an affected
undertaking.
Article 40 specifies that this notice may be subject to a number of
conditions. Silence for two months constitutes acceptance. The delay
is extended to six months if the Minister notifies the Council on Com-
petition. The Circular of February 14, 1978 listed some specifics on the
contents of the notification. These are adopted in the text of Article
28 of the new Decree.
2. Notifcation of the Council
In case of notification of a concentration, the Minister of the Econ-
omy alone has the option, though not the duty, to inform the Council
on Competition of the plan or the act of concentration. If the Minister
does so, she will advise the parties accordingly (Article 29). The Min-
ister must exercise the option to involve the Council within two
months, since the running of this delay means a tacit acceptance.
In the absence of jurisdiction by the Council, it may not give any
advice. In the absence of advice, the Minister in Charge of the Econ-
omy and the Minister in charge of the affected economic sector may
not issue injunctions or more generally follow the provisions of Arti-
cle 42.
Absent notification, jurisdiction of the Council may be obtained;
however, it may be obtained only after the expiration of a delay of
three months given to the undertakings in which they are to notify the
Council following application of Article 40 provisions.
By application of Article 16 provisions of the Decree, the Council
on Competition advises the administrative authorities of any jurisdic-
tion coming within their field of competence. These authorities have a
delay of two months in which to submit their comments. The adminis-
trative authorities are the Committee on the Stock Exchange, the Na-
tional Committee of Information and Freedoms, the Mediator of
Cinema, the Committee on Regulated Markets of Goods, the Banking
Committee, and the National Committee of Media and Freedoms.
3. Advice of the Council
The third phase involves the conclusion by the Council. The Coun-
cil investigates whether the planned concentration or concentration
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improves the economic progress sufficiently in order to attenuate the
negative effects on competition. The Council will take into account
the competitiveness of the involved undertakings with respect to the
international competition. It attaches to its report the comments of
the administrative authorities it has consulted.
4. Information of the Parties
Before making a decision, the Minister sends a draft (to which is
attached the advice of the Council) to the interested parties. These
parties are given a deadline by which to make their comments.
5. The Ministerial Decree
After the above deadline, the Minister may, by decision based on
the record (in one or more steps), issue injunctions which order the
undertaking not to proceed any further with the plan. If the operation
has already been undertaken, the Minister may order the undertaking
to reestablish the status quo ante, or take any such measure designed
to insure the maintenance, or restoration, of sufficient competition.
The foresight which went into the creation of this system which, at
every procedural stage, has the parties closely participate in the for-
mulation of the impending decision, is most commendable.
F. Powers of the Chair
The Chair of the Council of Competition has such powers as flow
from the provisions of the various articles of the Decree. The Chair
decides whether a matter will be submitted to the Permanent Com-
mittee without a prior report (Article 22), and establishes the number
and the make-up of the panels. She may refuse the release of informa-
tion which may jeopardize any business secrets (Article 23). In addi-
tion, she has the power to forward cases to the appropriate civil or
commercial jurisdictions in order to establish the liability of the au-
thor of the infractions cited in Article 36 of the Ordinance.
IV. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
A. Practices Tending to Exclude Competition or to Establish Dominance
Prohibited conspiracies and the abuse of dominant position will be
subject to the solutions adopted earlier that continue to guide the au-
thorities in charge of ensuring that the rules of competition are fol-
lowed. The examples given in Article 7 do not exactly duplicate those
which had been given in the text of old Article 50. The latter gave, as
examples, actions which would tend to restrain, block, or deviate from
the rules of competition. These examples included creating obstacles
for the lowering of prices, net sale or resale prices, favoring the artifi-
cial raising or lowering of prices, impeding technical progress and lim-
iting the free play of competition by other undertakings.
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The new list, however, addresses itself to limiting access to the
market or the free exercise of competition by other companies, creat-
ing obstacles to the free market, fixing prices by artificially raising or
lowering them, limiting production, outlets, investments or technical
progress, and allocating markets or sources of goods. In any event, the
previous case law continues to apply.
The text of Article 8, which forbids the abuse of dominant position,
deserves particular comment. Two distinct situations are contem-
plated. One is already known, while the other one is new (at least
since the law of December 30, 1985).
1. Abusive Exploitation of a Dominant Position
Article 3 of Law No. 63-628 of July 3, 1963 prohibited activities of
an undertaking, or a group of undertakings, exercising a dominant ac-
tivity when these activities "have as their object, or may have the ef-
fect of, the contravening of the normal functioning of the
marketplace." The notions of "concerned market," "obvious concen-
tration of economic power," and "dominant position" have become
part of positive law. There existed then a text and the burgeoning
case law of the European Community could have served as a guide.17
The abuse of the dominant position within the Common Market
assumed, and still assumes, the convergence of the following:
- the existence of a dominant position by one or more
undertakings;
- the existence of a market in which the suspected activity takes
place;
- the abuse of the exploitation of this dominant position; and
- the impact on commerce between Member States.
Under French domestic law, it is sufficient that the abusive exploita-
tion take place within the domestic market or a substantial part
thereof. The Decree gives a number of examples illustrating abusive
exploitation assuming that the seller is in the "dominant" position.
These include refusal to sell, tie-in sales, and discriminatory condi-
tions of sale.
2. Abusive Exploitation of the State of Economic Dependence
Such a situation presupposes a different type of "domination," a
state of economic dependence. The second sentence of Article 8 as-
17. E.g., Etablissements Consten v. Soci~t6 Union Nationale Des Economies Famili-
ales (UNEF), 1963 C.M.L.R. 176 (1963); Blume v. Van Praag, 1964 C.M.L.P 17
(1962); S.A. Le Corbeiller v. Soci6t6 Cooperative Marie Thumas, 1963 C.M.L.R.
146 (1962); Grundig Radio-Werke GmbH v. Technische Handelsondereming
Nibeja NV, 1962 C.M.L.R. 205 (1962); Case 6/54, Government of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
[1954 to 1956] E.C.R 103 (1955).
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sumes the two situations of when the dependent enterprise is a client
and when the dependent enterprise is a seller. It is necessary to look
for examples of these two situations in order to define the parameters
of this activity.
a. The Dependent Undertaking is a Customer
The conditions for illegal behavior by the selling enterprise appear
to be:
- the existence of products owned by the seller which the cus-
tomer needs;
- the practice of price or retailing arbitrarily imposed;
- an independence of action on the part of the seller regarding
the customer; and
- the absence of an equivalent solution. On this point the case
law will have to clarify the determinant factors. In industrial
matters, the notion of equivalence is easier understood on the
level of distribution.
It seems logical to conclude that if the customer is in a state of
"economic dependence" vis-A-vis its supplier, the latter is not in a state
of economic dependence vis-A-vis the customer. This would be the
case when, as far as the supplier is concerned, the new customer
would not be in a position to affect the volume of the supplier's sales
or the importance of its profits in a significant way.
The above would be the situation of the industrialist needing a
chemical product of a specific nature owned by the manufacturer.
More generally, it might be the situation of a customer whose survival,
or even whose competitive situation with respect to its rivals, would be
endangered by the abusive exploitation in which the supplier would
engage.
Examples of abusive exploitation given in the text include refusal
of sale, tie-in sales, and conditions of discriminatory sales. These dif-
ferent examples are examined later.
b. The Dependent Undertaking is the Supplier
This scenario illustrates the case of dependence with respect to
"large wholesalers." The conditions of illegality of the behavior of cli-
ent enterprise were difficult to delineate in that hypothesis.
A "large distributor" tries to obtain a better competitive situation
than the one his rivals have. It tries to obtain the most favorable
prices or better conditions of delivery or payment. It bases its require-
ments on the fact that the supplier would severely suffer from a re-
duction or elimination of its purchases.
It is, in any event, impossible to force a distributor to market a
product. In the past, the problem has not been resolved in a satisfac-
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tory manner. Article 37 of the "Royer" Law prohibited the practice of
"prices and discriminatory conditions of sale which are not justified by
the corresponding differences in the net prices of the delivery or ser-
vice." Additionally, Article 38, which was most rarely applied, forbade
the action of "all resellers who tried to obtain or to knowingly accept,
any advantages in violation of the provisions of Article 37."
The law of December 30, 1985 eliminated those two articles and
replaced them with the following language: ".... [t]o practice with re-
spect to an economic partner, to ask him or obtain from him discrimi-
natory prices or conditions of sale, or gifts in kind or in money under
conditions which would affect competition." This text was similar to
the previous text.
The new rule is aimed at a pre-existing contractual situation. It
forbids:
the abusive exploitation by an undertaking, or a group of undertakings, of the
economic dependence status in which a supplier customer finds itself, who
does not have an equivalent solution, particularly when the distributor cuts
off the commercial relations which existed before for the only reason that its
business partner refuses to subject itself to unjustified commercial conditions.
This is defined as "differential treatment."
The conditions of this abusive exploitation of the economic depen-
dence in which a supplier finds itself vis-A-vis the distributor seem to
be the following:
- the existence of a state of economic dependence between the
supplier and the distributor to the latter's profit;
- the existence of pre-existing commercial relations between the
supplier and the distributor;
- the insistence by the distributor to subject the seller to unjusti-
fied commercial conditions; and
- the cessation of commercial relations based on the sole ground
of the refusal to accept these unjustified commercial conditions.
B. Anti-competitive Practices Aimed At by the Prohibition
Article 59 which became Article 51 of the Decree of June 30, 1945,
abolished by the new text, provided that "Article 50 does not deal with
concerted actions, agreements or understandings, including the activi-
ties of an undertaking or a group of undertakings which occupy a dom-
inant position:
1. When they result from a legislative text or regulation;
2. To the extent that their authors may justify them when their
intended effect is the assurance of economic progress, particularly by
increasing productivity."
The new text which springs from the prohibition of "friendly un-
derstandings," reiterates the provision concerning agreements result-
ing from the application of a regulatory or legislative text. It also
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provides some precision on the limits of the second sentence by repro-
ducing the text of the third sentence of Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome. Finally, it provides for exemptions by categories.'S
The result of the totality of these provisions is that four categories
of "practices" are not considered to be illegal. These include:
- those which are not aimed at by Articles 7 and 8 of the Decree;
- those that are included in Articles 7 and 8, but which are ex-
empt from the prohibition by the text of clause 1 of Article 10 of
the Decree;
- those which are prohibited by Articles 7 and 8, but which are
exempt from the prohibition by virtue of the text of the second
sentence of Article 10 of the Decree; and
- those "contracts" which will be exempt by decree after positive
opinion from the Council on Competition.
The above provision seems to exclude "large undertakings." It
seems, therefore, that to create a discrimination between economic op-
erators is left to the discretion of the administration since no defini-
tion is given of what constitutes a "small" or "average" enterprise.
This is regrettable, particularly in light of the fact that the economic
regulation tends to consider groups of corporations and not only indi-
vidual undertakings.
Will a corporation which is completely controlled by one or several
"large enterprises" be considered "small" or "average" if one looks
only to the amount of its capital, the number of its employees or its
business volume as criteria? Or, will it be subject to an amalgam with
the "large undertakings" in the category to which the mother corpora-
tion belongs?
Further, the proposed liberalization can be drastically reduced by
the administrative power. In fact, the text does not call for a
mandatory consultation with the Council on Competition. The De-
18. Paragraph 3 Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome basically provides:
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
-.any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-_any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indis-
pensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN EcoNoMc CoMnUNrrY [EEC TREATY],
art. 85, § 3,298 U.N.T.S. 11, 48 as cited in MILTON HANDLER, HARLAN M. BLAKE,
ROBERT PrTOFSKY & HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMiD, TRADE REGULATION 25 (3d ed.
1990).
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cree, as stated in Article 10, will be issued upon the conforming advice
of the Council. Consequently, if the Administration intends to refuse
its approval of a proposed contract, it will not have to get any "con-
forming advice" from the Council. It is only if the Council feels that
the agreements have "as an object to improve the management of the
undertakings" that they can be recognized as satisfying the conditions
imposed by Article 10. They must, however, then also be approved by
the Council. In other words, the regulatory role of the Council starts
only after an initial favorable decision by the Administration. If the
initial decision is unfavorable, the Council does not have to be con-
sulted since its advice would then not be "in conformance."
1. Legislative or Regulatory Texts
The "legislative" texts constitute a clearly defined category of
"texts." The regulatory texts started a controversy which led to an
extensive interpretation of the reach of the word "regulatory." The
new ordinance seems to limit this broad interpretation to "a regula-
tory text taken for its application." This seems to exclude circulars or
ministerial letters.
2. Development of Economic Progress
The necessity of involving users in the benefit of the agreement, as
provided by Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome,19 has been required,
in French domestic law, by several opinions issued by the Technical
Commission.20
The Decree of December 1, 1986 adds two conditions: one which
forbids "the possibility to eliminate competition for a substantial part
of the products involved," and one which requires "the sufficiency of
the tie" between the alleged economic advantages and the incriminat-
ing practices.2 1 These two negative conditions are in the text of the
third sentence of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome. The case law of
the Brussels Commission (ECC) will, therefore, be important in the
understanding of the advantageous economic character of an agree-
ment which may conceivably be within the prohibition.22
19. See, e.g., W.A. Hoyng and M.B.W. Biesheuvel, The Know-How Group Exemption,
26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 219 (1989).
20. See, the Notice of Mar. 17, 1972, Enterprise for the Laying of Electrical Under-
ground Canalizations in the Region of Lyon, and the Notice of Apr. 25, 1975,
Procirep.
21. There also, we talk about a requirement, examples of which can be found since
1955. They include Avis Abrasives and Molds, Dec. 17, 1955; Avis, Manufacturer
of electrical insulated cables, Jan. 19,1957; Avis antislipping devices for cars, June
8, 1978 (link was deemed insufficient, and in any event "the users or consumers
had not received any benefit").
22. E.g., Case 242/87, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the
European Communities, 1989 E.C.R. 1425, 1 C.M.L.R. 478 (1989); Case 45/86, Re
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3. Exemptions
Certain categories of agreements, particularly when their objective
is to improve the management of small or medium business firms, may
be recognized as meeting these conditions following a decree issued
after conforming advice from the Council on Competition is received.
It seems that this involves certain types of contracts, particularly con-
tracts of selective distribution, defined for the first time by the French
Supreme Court in the well-known decisions of November 3, 1982. The
text of the Decree does not give the procedure to be followed by small
or medium firms desiring to obtain the benefit of an exemption
decree.
Will the administrative decision permitting such an agreement be
binding on the tribunals which, if everything else fails, would have to
examine its conformity with the requirements of Article 10? Un-
doubtedly, it will be binding since we refer to an agreement issued "by
decree." It would have been unlikely to see consular magistrates,
criminal tribunals or, eventually, common law tribunals (which may
be called on to decide issues involving commercial firms when these
issues are peripheral to conflicts involving trademarks or patents) find
agreements to be illegal when validated by the regulatory power. On
the other hand, the courts might declare agreements not submitted to
the procedure for exemption by groups to be valid.
Finally, the text of Article 26, paragraph 2, provides "the Council
being consulted by the jurisdictions on the anticompetitive practices
defined in Articles 7 and 8, and involved in the matters within their
jurisdiction... ." It would seem then that the tribunals would have
concurring jurisdiction with the Council on Competition and have the
authority to decide whether these activities fall within the prohibited
or the exempt category.
C. Sanctions
The text of Article 52 of the Decree of June 30, 1945 provided that,
after getting the advice of the Commission, the Minister could, except
in an emergency, repeat offense or flagrant violation:
- forward the file to the Prosecutor in order to apply the provi-
sions of the Decree or Article 419 of the Penal Code;
- offer a friendly settlement as provided for in Article 33; or
- impose a fine with or without publication (Article 53, at the
end).
Delicate procedural problems were bound to arise. These were the
Generalized Tariff Preferences: EC Commission v. EC Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493,
2 C.M.L.R. 131 (1987); Case 15/83, Denkavit Nederland BV v. Hoofproduukt-
schap Voor Akkerbouwprodukten, 1984 E.C.R. 2171 (reference for a preliminary
ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven).
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subject of a seminal analysis by Professor Decocq.23 Of course, Article
419 of the Penal Code has now become part of history.
1. Nullity, Monetary Sanctions and Injunctions
Article 9 states that any agreement, convention, or contractual
clause is void when it involves a prohibited practice under Articles 7
and 8. This decision may be made by the Council, or by any competent
jurisdiction which is called on to look into the practices which are the
subject of the complaint.
The Council has the ability to impose immediate monetary dam-
ages (Article 13). If the offender is an undertaking, the maximum is
five percent of the gross business volume, ex taxes, in France during
the last fiscal year. If the offender is not an undertaking, the maxi-
mum is 10 million francs.
The publication of the Council's decision may be ordered at the ex-
pense of the affected person (Article 13, last paragraph). Further, the
Council may also issue injunctions. These do not have a penal
character.
2. Entering into Prohibited Agreements
The text provides for an aggravated offense which comes within
the jurisdiction of criminal tribunals. Article 17 provides for a jail sen-
tence of six months to four years and a fine of 5,000 to 500,000 francs,
or one of those penalties, in a very specific case of "[w]hen a natural
person fraudulently takes a personal and determining part in the crea-
tion, organization or implementation of the practices condemned by
Articles 7 and 13."
The above-referenced text will undoubtedly create several
problems. The first problem arises with the interpretation of the ad-
verb "fraudulently." It is evident that the authors of the Decree of
December 1, 1986, which decriminalized the infractions of economic
legislation, wanted to make an exception for cases involving particu-
larly grievous infractions. The threat, implicit in the adverb, should
not fail to have a salutary effect on any possible excesses. This is the
assumption behind the provisions at the end of Article 11.
A second difficulty which may arise is that civil and criminal tribu-
nals have, with the Council on Competition, concurrent jurisdiction
which permits them to determine whether the practices submitted to
them are prohibited by the provisions of Articles 7 and 8, and equally,
whether these practices come within the prohibitions of paragraphs 1
23. L'article 419 du Code P6nal est-il devenu un Texte historque?, REv. JUl- COM.,
No. special: Actualite du Droit Frangais de la Concurrence, Dec. 1980. Transla-
tion-Has Article 419 of the Penal Code become a historical text? This is now a
rhetorical question.
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and 2 of Article 10. Assume that, in conformance with the provisions
of Article 11 of the Decree, the Council on Competition forwards the
file to the Prosecutor for indictment and prosecution of the actors as
provided in Article 17. In such a case, the Prosecutor is not thereby
deprived of the authority to investigate the allegations in the file.
The criminal tribunals obtain jurisdiction under the terms of Arti-
cle 17 only after the exhaustion of procedure before the Council. In
fact, Article 26 provides that the civil, commercial, or penal jurisdic-
tions should consult with the Council. If they may consult the Coun-
cil, it means that they would have to wait for the Council's advice
before they could rule on this matter, even though the advice would
not be binding on them. This advice will constitute, as do the "letters
of classification" issued by the Commission in Brussels, a factual ele-
ment which the jurisdictions may take into account in making their
decision.
3. Return to the "Status Quo Ante"
Independent of these "classic" administrative or judicial sanctions,
Article 43 of the Decree provides for a sanction of exceptional gravity.
It has consequences which are no less exceptional. In case of an abu-
sive exploitation of a dominant position--and the text adds, "or of a
state of economic dependence,"-the Council on Competition may
"ask the Minister in charge of the Economy to enjoin, together with
the Minister whose sector is affected, to 'modify' to 'complete' or to
cancel" all agreements and all acts by which economic concentration is
achieved... "even if these acts are the object of the procedure pro-
vided for in the present title." This sanction may apply not only to
firms which have gone ahead with a concentration since the issuance
of the Decree even if the acts are the object of the procedure provided
for in the present act, but also to all concentrations conceived and im-
plemented before the issuance of the Decree, since no limit on the
affected concentrations is set.
4. Action of the Prosecutor, the Minister or the Chair Before
Civil and Commercial Jurisdictions
One innovation has been to give the Prosecutor, the Minister and
the President of the Council on Competition the option to prosecute
before civil and commercial jurisdictions discriminatory practices, re-
fusal of sales, and tie-ins. As a result, once a complaint is filed with
the Mfinister--and there are many-the administration may start the
judicial procedure.
The Prosecutor, the Minister, and the Chair of the Council on
Competition may then have their opinion known to those jurisdic-
tions. It seems that this situation calls into effect the power of the
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requesting parties to denounce these procedures and ask all three au-
thorities to intervene.
It can be important to inform the tribunals of the opinion of the
Prosecutor, the Minister, or the President of the Council on Competi-
tion. As well, it is important to permit the Council to take, by virtue
of Article 12 provisions, the conservatory measures which may be
asked for by the complaining parties in the case of anticompetitive
practices.
In the case of restrictive practices, the President of the Council, the
Minister and the representative of the Public Ministry, may, in accord-
ance with the last paragraph of Article 36, ask the judge to issue a
judicial order.
V. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES
Restrictive practices are named in Title IV of the Decree. Title IV
also includes a provision for the piercing of the corporate veil in rela-
tionships between professionals.
The doctrine designates the following practices under the name of
individual practices in contrast to the agreements or actions of under-
takings in position of absolute, or relative, domination: information to
the consumer; sales with discounts; various forms of refusal to sell; the
necessity to bill; loss sales; the communication of lists and conditions
of sale; the practice of imposed prices; the illegal use of public domain;
and illegal competition of associations or cooperatives of business
firms or administrations. The following is a quick look into these vari-
ous chapters seriatim.
A. Consumer Information
Article 28 deals with the relationships between professionals and
consumers. The right of publication of prices to the consumer is as-
sured by marking, ticketing, posting or any other appropriate means.
The latter category includes, for instance, the delivery of notices.
Several regulations specifically aimed at these practices have been
published. It would be useless to attempt to give an inventory here.
Article 28 of the Decree refers, as to marking, ticketing or posting, to
the applicable "regulations issued by decree of the Minister in charge
of the Economy, after consultation with the national Consumers'
Council." Violations of these regulations are punishable by the impo-
sition of fifth class misdemeanor fines.
One should note that the obligation to inform the consumer also
includes eventual limitations of the contractual liability and any other
special conditions of the sale. The reference to the eventual limita-
tions of contractual liability seems peculiar, particularly when under
French law, since they are only permitted in transactions between
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professionals within the same specialty. Moreover, the EEC Directive
of July 25, 1985, "relating to the coordination of legislative regulatory
and administrative provisions of the Member States in matters of lia-
bility due to defective products,"24 became applicable in France as of
July 31, 1988, unless France proceeded to an elaboration of its regula-
tions of matters dealt with in this Directive.
B. Sales with Discounts
The law of March 20, 1951, amended several times, dealing with
immediate or deferred discounts, is abrogated. The new text impliedly
authorizes discounts between professionals since the prohibition ap-
plies only to offers of sales or the sales themselves, offers of services or
services to consumers. This prohibition does not apply to minor ob-
jects, services of little value or samples.
The text of the Decree delves into minute specificity (Articles 23 to
25) and provides for seven percent of the net price TTC if the latter is
lower or equal to 500 francs or 30 francs plus one percent of the net
price defined above if the latter is over 500 francs. This value, in any
event, may not exceed 350 francs. It means TTC departure at point of
production for items produced in France, or francs and customs paid at
the French border for imported items.
This wealth of detail is understandable. One must distinguish be-
tween "small items" or "services of little value" which are mentioned
in the second paragraph of Article 29 dealing with samples.
Samples must show the notice, "Sample-may not be sold," written
in a legible, indelible and visible manner. "Minor items" and "services
of little value" are authorized within the parameters which have been
outlined. The marking must be apparent and indelible, but the refer-
ence to "normal position of utilization" has disappeared.25 In addition
to these exceptions, there are also exclusions.
The provisions of Article 24 of the Decree provide that the follow-
ing actions are not considered as discounts:
- the normal maintenance of the product;
- the after-sale services and the availability of warehousing; and
- the rendering of services which are usually given for free if
these services are not the subject of a contract for consideration
and are without mercantile value.
The non-observance of this new regulation is subject to the penal pro-
visions provided for fifth class misdemeanors. This regulation is more
liberal than the old one, even though the principle of prohibition has
been maintained.
24. Case 85/374, C.EXE.; See, 1985 J.O.C.E. (L 210) 29.
25. See, Decree No. 86-1309 of Dec. 26, 1986.
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C. The Refusal to Sell
The refusal to sell was formerly dealt with in Article 37.1(A) of the
Decree of June 30, 1945. Several examples of refusals of sale are men-
tioned in the text of the new Decree.
The old incriminating action provided for certain conditions to be
met. This included that a request of normal character be made in good
faith and a refusal be made by a third party owning available products,
as long as the sale was not forbidden by regulation.
The notion of "unavailability" of the materials gave way to legal
unavailability. Thus, the contract of selective distribution may be used
in such a way as to make unavailable the goods to which they refer.
One should clearly distinguish, as the Supreme Court has done, the
exclusive concession contract from the selective distribution contract.
The exclusive concession contract has, for a long time, permitted
the distributor to successfully pursue for illegal or disloyal competi-
tion the third party, who not being a distributor, could obtain, often
thanks to a parallel distribution network which was not controlled by
the franchisor, a product without the permission of the distributor.
The above scenario has occurred frequently, particularly in the case of
large foreign firms tied to exclusive French importers. The third par-
ties would obtain products which were part of the exclusive import
agreement from other countries of the Common Market. The exclu-
sive distributor would then start a claims procedure before a consular
jurisdiction to put an end to the situation which, in effect, eroded the
monopoly which had been granted to him. Since the Supreme Court
(Cour de Cassation) decision of February 16, 1982 in Mitsubishi, these
actions are no longer considered by national tribunals to be violations.
In contrast, the commercialization of products under a selective
distribution contract constitutes an act of illegal competition because
it harms the commercial network of the franchisor as well as the in-
terests of the consumer. As a matter of fact, the selective distribution
contract assumes a whole set of reciprocal obligations to which the
parties subscribe, and this in the interest of the final user. As soon as
the totality of these conventional contractual arrangements has been
harmed, the consumer's interest is no longer protected.
Decisions rendered by the commercial tribunals, the tribunals of
Great Instance and the Courts of Appeal26 give numerous examples of
the selective distribution contract situation. If the selective distribu-
tion contracts are subject to a decree of exemption, or in the absence
of a decree of exemption, they are found to be within the conditions
26. Court of Poitiers, Lanvin v. Hyvernat; Court of Nimes, Nina Ricci, Givenchy,
Dior, Lanvin, Jean Marc, Sinan v. Auchan; Court of Grenoble, Court of Lyon,
Court of Rennes, Court of Toulouse, etc ....
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imposed by Article 10, paragraph 2. Previous case law may continue to
apply.
The conditions of a prohibited refusal to deal flow from the
enumeration of Article 36. The text has implicitly adopted the previ-
ous provisions, but has justifiably replaced the notion of "unavailabil-
ity" by express reference to Article 10. In other words, the Decree of
December 1, 1986 only contemplates the judicial unavailability which
may result either by virtue of existing agreements which are exoner-
ated by paragraphs 1 or 2 or because of an exemption by category re-
sulting from a decree issued after conforming advice by the Council on
Competition. However, the refusal to deal under Article 36 cannot be
the object of an aggravating circumstance.
More serious is the refusal to deal as defined in Article 8. It is
subject to the preexistence of a position of absolute or relative domi-
nance, and the abusive exercise of this dominance by the person refus-
ing to sell.
There remains, however, the scenario of a violation of civil charac-
ter. In this scenario, there would be an "aggravated" refusal which
would justify the recourse of forwarding the file to the Prosecutor of
the Republic for the application of Article 17 in the case of "fraud" in
the creation, the organization or the implementation of such practices.
Finally, there remains the prohibition of the refusal to sell to a
consumer (Article 30) without legitimate reason. Article 6 of the De-
cree states that such violations are subject to the sanctions provided
for fifth class misdemeanors.
Article 30 contemplates other prohibitions previously the subject
matter of Article 37.1(c) of the Decree of June 30, 1945. In fact, Arti-
cle 30 assimilated the practice of illegal pricing to the fact of condition-
ing the sale of a product, either to the sale of another product, the
rendering of another service, or the purchase of a specific quantity of
one product or another service. The sanction is a fifth class misde-
meanor. The new text incorporates Article 37.1(c), but limits its appli-
cation to relationships between professionals and consumers.
D. The Obligation to Bill
Bills are accounting items which are created at the time of a trans-
action between professionals. They evidence a purchase, the render-
ing of services or a sale, and record transactions between
businesspersons. A merchant is not obliged to give a bill to a
consumer.
The Decree of June 30, 1945 (Articles 46 to 49) contained a heavy
arsenal of constraints. The new text is much simpler. A new require-
ment is nevertheless imposed on merchants and manufacturers,
namely the stating of "all discounts, kickbacks or takebacks, the prin-
ciple of which is established and the amount of which can be deter-
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mined at the time of the sale or the rendering of services, regardless of
the date of settlement." 27
Decree #86-1309 provides that originals or copies will be kept for a
period of three years. This time frame is shorter than the commercial
Statute of Limitations, and the duration of fiscal prescription. It ap-
pears to be insufficient.
Wanting to stress to violators the gravity of such an infraction, the
drafters of the Decree have not referred back to another Article pro-
viding for penalties. Article 31 is immediately specific in that a fine of
5,000 to 100,000 Francs may apply when an infraction has occurred.
E. Sales at a Loss
The law of July 2, 1963 prohibited, in its first Article, "the domestic
resale of all goods at a lower price than its actual purchase price in-
cluding the business volume taxes involved in this resale." The doc-
trine, case law and regulations have for the past twenty years looked
at these practices as being misleading.28
The exceptions to the prohibition provided for in Article 1 remain
since the previous law has not been abolished. These violations carry
a penalty of from two months to two years in jail and a fine of 60 to
200,000 francs, or only one of the penalties.
Article 32 of the ordinance modifying the Law of July 2, 1963 is
more precise with respect to the minimum level of a loss sale. The
purchase price must be increased by the volume of business tax, the
specific taxes relating to the sale and, eventually, the cost of transpor-
tation. The fines are reduced and range from 5,000 to 100,000 francs.
F. The Publication of Price Schedules and Conditions of Sale
The openness of the market requires that economic operators
know the actual conditions under which sales and purchases by their
competitors are made. This openness was assured by the provisions of
paragraph 2, Article 37 of the law of December 27, 1973, which was
then abolished by the law of December 30, 1985.
Paragraph (g) was added to the text of Ordinance No. 45-1483 of
June 30, 1945. This provision, subjecting violators to penal sanctions,
was the following: "5-By all producer[s], wholesaler[s] or importer[s]
to refuse to reveal to any retailer who will ask for it his price list and
the conditions of sale. This publication will be made by whatever
27. Referring to that objective is the comment of the Letter of the Distribution of
December 1986, and the reference which is made therein to "all upon bill" evoked
by the Commission of Production - Distribution - Service of CNPF directed by
Sylvain Wibaux. THE NEW ECONOMIsT, Nov. 21, 1986, at 60.
28. Id. See, Law No. 65-549 of July 9, 1965 and the Circular and Communication of
May 30, 1970.
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means and trade usages [which] are followed in their particular
profession."
Article 33 specifies, in addition, that the conditions of sale include
the conditions of payment and, eventually, the discounts and rebates.
Finally, the ordinance added a sentence referring to the transfer of
certain services which are normally rendered by the seller at the ex-
pense of the distributor. This sentence states that "[t]he conditions
under which the distributor will be paid in return for specific services
must be stated in writing."
G. The Practice of Mandatory Sale Prices
This practice is forbidden under severe penalties for which fines
range from 5,000 to 10,000 francs. The practice of suggested retail
prices, however, was not forbidden. In fact, it was provided for in the
language of Article 3(b) of the ordinance of June 30, 1945, although
this ordinance has since been abolished.
The current situation remains unchanged. The practice of sug-
gested retail prices is not prohibited. However, it would be wise to
point out to retailers that the prices which are given to them are
"purely advisory."
H. Illegal Utilization of the Public Domain
The last two subsections of this list show with what care the ex-
perts analyzed the totality of the problem of certain unfair practices
that affect the retail trade. These practices deviate considerable quan-
tities of goods and services to the prejudice of small or medium enter-
prises. This subsection will examine the illegal utilization of the
public domain. The competition to which merchants are subjected by
associations, cooperatives of undertakings or the administration is the
subject of the next subsection.
Mercantile associations were frequently upset by sales made on the
public way by individuals who did not follow the fiscal and social obli-
gations incumbent upon merchants. The regulation of January 3, 1965
subjected street sales to specific constraints. Its aim was to maintain
normal competition, while respecting the freedom of trade. This law
has not been abolished, but Article 37 of the new law extends the area
of its application. It now applies to an offer for sale, to every person.
This seems to include the agricultural producer who has been exoner-
ated of the constraints of the law of January 3, 1969 for the sale of the
product of his own operation. Additionally, as far as the public do-
main is concerned, the public governmental domain, as well as local
collectives and their public establishments are included. Infractions
are punished by the fines provided for fifth class misdemeanors.
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I. Illegal Competition of Associations or Cooperatives of Undertakings or
Administrations
The cooperatives of enterprises or administration are consumer co-
operatives. As is usual with cooperatives, they sell their members the
goods which they buy or produce. They may distribute the profits
which result from these activities on a prorated basis to the purchas-
ing consumers. However, they may also donate all or part of the profit
to charitable organizations.
The legal rules under which these corporations operate are found
in the law of May 7, 1917. This text of good intentions quickly became
an instrument of unfair competition since the cooperatives do not
limit their activities to sale to their members, but sell to outsiders as
well.
Statutory mentions were called for under the terms of Article 7 of
the law of September 10, 1947. However, they referred to formal con-
straints and left too much freedom to other forms of unfair competi-
tion under which the merchants suffered.
In 1979 (Circular of March 10, 1979), after nearly thirty years, the
public officials decided again to fight certain practices by the coopera-
tives. This was the first time that cooperatives had been obliged to
show in their rules the normal forms of offers of sales when selling or
offering services to non-members. Finally, the fiscal services could
then reestablish a balance between these economic operators by sub-
jecting them to the same constraints.
Infractions are punished by the fines provided for fifth class misde-
meanors. However, the Decree is not specific as to which of the man-
agers will be subjected to these penalties. It would have been a good
idea to have been more precise.
In addition, commercial firms which are the victims of unfair com-
petition from such cooperatives may file for a cease-and-desist action.
Moreover, they may file for damages and interest under the provision
that proof as to the "usual" character of these "sales" or "offers of
sale" must be made.
Finally, it would be logical that from now on undertakings which
are mandated to sell to these cooperatives and which, under the provi-
sions of the ordinance of June 30, 1945, were subject to claims based on
Article 37 1(A)29 in the case of refusal of sales, to demonstrate as a
defense, that the claimant, not having amended its by-laws to conform
with the Decree of December 1, 1986, acted in bad faith.
29. See, Paris 28.6.1961; JCP 1962 Ed.C.I.I 700 132. More recently, as to the applicabil-
ity of the Dec. 1, 1986 Decree to agricultural cooperatives, see, e.g., Esquerre et
autre, Cassation d'Agen (ch. corr., Jan. 16, 1989), decision issued Feb. 12, 1990
(Rec. Dalloz-Sircy, 1991; Sommaires comments, 29e cabier, p. 247).
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J. Procedures for the Finding of Economic Violations
In abolishing Ordinance 45-1484 of June 30, 1945, which concerned
the finding of economic infractions, the new Decree puts an end to
more than forty years of exorbitant powers given to government
agents. These powers, in theory, if not always in practice, resulted in
conferring to government agents a freedom of initiative and investiga-
tion even greater than that enjoyed by the offices of the judicial police
in charge of violent criminal investigations.
In 1945, the objective was to uncover various economic criminals;
people resorting to fraud and profiteers of the black market who were
operating in an economy which was seriously unbalanced. The text
had been used, however, for over forty years, even when the excep-
tional circumstances which led to its inception no longer existed. This
is probably because when the government asserts excessive powers
granted to it, it is rare that it will abandon them. One should, there-
fore, applaud the effort to make the procedure of investigations of eco-
nomic violations in agreement with the rules of common law, even if
these rules are not necessarily followed entirely.
The most important reform in this domain is the necessity for in-
vestigators wanting to proceed in searches and seizures to obtain a
warrant from a judge in advance. Henceforth, investigators must ob-
tain authorization from a judge acting upon a formal request made by
the investigators. In accordance with the spirit of the Decree and the
literal text, it would seem that this is not a mere formality since the
judge "must verify" that the request for authorization submitted to
him is made in good faith. Once the authorization has been given, no
appeal is possible, except an appeal to the Supreme Court which,
strangely enough, is made in accordance with the rules of the Code of
the Penal Procedure.
These regulations seem to prohibit the making of a request for re-
traction, for instance, by the party who is the subject of the inquiry
(Article 48). The text of Article 48 calls for two observations. First,
the authorizations may be more easily granted in practice to the ex-
tent that there will not exist in the judiciary, and within each jurisdic-
tion, a sufficient number of magistrates who are conversant with the
practice of economic law. The judge who is to give the authorization
will face government agents who are increasingly specialized in that
area. These agents may very well exert undue influence on the judge
insofar as the interpretation of certain statutory texts is concerned.
In any event, it seems that government agents may not proceed to a
search simply in order to control the merchants' activities. They must
have, at the very least, certain indications or indices, possibly rumors,
which may lead to the conclusion that certain firms are acting in viola-
tion of the rules of competition provided by the Decree.
A second observation concerns the drafting and ordering of the
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texts, since Article 48 is preceded by Article 47. This order indicates
that the investigators may enter any premises, property or means of
business transportation, require the production of books, bills and
other documents and gather, upon notice or on-the-spot, all informa-
tion and all justification. They may even ask the authority on which
they depend that an expert be designated to proceed to any necessary
adversarial expertise (a power which is not, properly speaking, novel).
One may, therefore, wonder if Article 47 brings forth a principle
giving total freedom of investigation to government agents, and that
Article 48 only introduces a restriction on the possibility to proceed to
such searches and seizures without having first obtained judicial au-
thorization. Does not the power to "accede to all business areas" mean
a search within the meaning of Article 48? Is there not a conflict?
Must we interpret the statutory texts of Article 47 to mean that the
government agents may, without judicial authority, but with the au-
thorization or the consent of the person regulated or visited, collect
such information? On the other hand, one would need a judicial au-
thorization each time it was necessary to proceed to a "real investiga-
tion." The line distinguishing a simple visit (or search) from an
investigation will be difficult to establish. In any event, as soon as an
investigation has been started upon judicial authorization (Article 48),
the President of the Council on Competition must be immediately in-
formed of the existence of this investigation. He may propose that the
Council take the matter under advisement immediately.
Once the Council takes a matter under advisement, one or several
rapporteurs will be designated to examine the matter. The rap-
porteur, playing a role similar to that of an investigative magistrate,
will define the orientation of the inquiry and designate the agents of
the government involved who are subject to interrogatories. The in-
vestigators may have access to all documents or elements of informa-
tion which are in the hands of the government and the public
collectives. They need not worry about professional secrecy.
Obstruction of the investigative power of government agents is
punishable by imprisonment of two to six months and/or a fine of
5,000 to 50,000 francs. There is no specificity regarding whether the
fine will be imposed on the corporation or only on the natural persons
representing it. Absent such specificity, we must deduce that it is the
natural persons who must pay the fine without the possibility of reim-
bursement by the corporation.3 0
Finally, we must note an important reform brought about by Arti-
cle 46. Article 46 provides that the various minutes of the activities
made within the framework of the inquiry will constitute proof unless
30. See, e.g., Jean-Francois Bellis, International Trade and the Competition Law of
the European Economic Community, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 647 (1979).
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contrary evidence is produced. Previously, under the Ordinance of
1945, these same minutes were proof of authenticity until proven false,
at least insofar as the material fact finding by the government was
concerned. However, the procedure of alleging falsehood is a danger-
ous one. It was certainly of such nature to discourage the regulated
persons from challenging the correctness of these minutes.
Article 31 of Decree 86-1309 of December 29, 1986 practically
adopts the terms of Article 7 of Ordinance 45-1484. In particular, it is
stated that the minutes must be drafted "in the shortest delay." The
case law has always left the definition of the "shortness" of the delay
to the discretion of the courts. It is, thus, that a delay of several days
to several months31 and even 18 months 32 has been considered as satis-
fying the requirements of "brevity" insofar as a particular activity was
concerned. The length of delay depended upon the degree of difficulty
in drafting the appropriate minutes.
One must, therefore, conclude that since the new text has adopted
the same language, the same jurisprudential solution fully pertains.
On the other hand, the new text still provides for the "relevant" per-
son but not for the "delinquent" person. This was a very revealing gap
in the drafting of the old Article 7 of Ordinance 45-1484. One was de-
linquent as soon as the government attested to the violation (signed
the minutes). No further mention is made in the scenario wherein the
"delinquent" could not be identified. While the sentence itself disap-
peared from the new draft, it seems logical that the government may
draft factfinding memoranda against "unknowns."
Article 32 concerns memoranda which are made in connection with
a "search" and a "seizure." These memoranda are usually connected
with the authorization of the judge. They must be made on the spot.
Finally, an interesting protective provision is that the seized docu-
ments may not be held against the interested person until they have
been given back or until the interested persons have had a chance to
read them. The corporate managers are, in fact, not computers. It
seems normal to give them a certain delay in which to think before
they must explain the contents and the breadth of the documents even
if they have been taken from the files of the corporation.
K. Conclusions
French businessmen should rejoice in noting that the reform they
had hoped for has finally come. The new rules of the economic game
will not fail to bring the remedies necessary to enable businesspersons
to defend their positions in the universe of furious competition. They
31. One delay of seven months was even permitted (Cass. crim. 16 July 1980; J.C.P.
IV, No. 372 (1980).
32. Court of Appeals of Paris, Feb. 8, 1983; G.P. J1 367 (1983).
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will undoubtedly complain, however, that no amnesty has been pro-
vided for the benefit of corporate managers who were investigated and
sentenced under the previous penal provisions.
They will find out that rather than disappear, the refusal of sale
claim will remain a weapon for the retailers and an obstacle to the
producer's decision to freely choose the method of distribution of their
products. The previous text made refusal of sale an infraction.
Is the new state of affairs much more liberal? Not necessarily, be-
cause, under the terms of the new Decree, there are six refusals of
sale. They are as follows:
- the simple refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position
(Article 8);
- the refusal aggravated by fraud and issued by one undertak-
ing-or several undertakings in a dominant position (Articles 8
and 17);
- the simple refusal against an undertaking in an economic de-
pendence relative to the person refusing the sale (Article 8);
- the refusal aggravated by fraud against an undertaking in eco-
nomic dependency in relation to the person refusing the sale
(Articles 8 and 17);
- the refusal against a consumer (Article 30); and
- the refusal without justification of Article 36.
Article 62 of the old Ordinance, which legitimized the refusal of sale
when the merchandise was for export, has not been maintained.
It is clear that the right of defense has been highly scrutinized.
The decision of the Constitutional Council, resulting in an absence of a
moratorium on an execution (which is the result of any appeals to the
Court of Appeals of Paris), proceeds from the same concern. We may
note, at this point, that the new French rules of domestic competition
tend to follow the competition principles of the European Commu-
nity. The executive, the legislative and the regulatory powers have
been quiet. The word is now to the judicial power.
VI. EEC-ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE TREATY OF ROME
A. Introduction and Overview of EEC Law on Competition33
Following the 1957 creation of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) by the Treaty of Paris, the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), from its inception that same year, has adopted a
fundamental policy that competition shall be maintained. To effect
this policy, the EEC adopted, among others, Articles 85 and 86 of the
33. This section of the article, which deals with the EEC, is based primarily on the
introduction in the following book. see, Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIs BEas,
COMPETrrrON LAW OF THE EuRoPEAN EcoNoMIc COMMUNrrY (1990).
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Treaty of Rome.3 4 In that same year, EURATOM, the European
Atomic Energy Community was created. All three treaties were heav-
ily influenced by French thinking. This French influence has lessened
over the years to the benefit of German resurgence.
According to the Commission of the European Communities, EEC
competition policy has three fundamental objectives. First, the EEC
seeks to create and maintain a single market for the benefit of both
consumers and business. Second, it aims to prevent large businesses
from engaging in anticompetitive behavior. Lastly, the EEC supports
effective production, distribution and technological development. The
European antitrust philosophy is strongly pro-consumer, while still
protective of the Community's interests. This results in a pragmatic
approach to cooperative agreements which enhances exports to coun-
tries outside the EEC.
In early 1991, the now outgoing Commissioner on Competition, Sir
Leon Brittan, stated that all efforts would be made to match the Coal
and Steel Treaty regulations with the enforcement practices of the
Treaty of Rome. It should be noted that the Coal and Steel Treaty
ends in the year 2002.
Another important regulatory rule that was created in early 1962
by the Council of Ministers is the so-called Regulation 17, which im-
plements and expands on Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
Regulation 17 gives jurisdiction on a variety of issues involving the
enforcement of the Economic Community (EC) Competition Law. It
also gives important powers to the Competition Directorate General of
the Commission. In addition to pre-merger notifications which are
mandatory under the Treaty of Rome, Regulation 17 provides for gen-
eral investigative powers by the Commission.36
The Commission may grant individual exemptions for limited peri-
ods of time under Article 85(3), but it is interesting to note that the
Commission may still prosecute under Article 86. It is even more in-
teresting to note that the Commission under Regulation 17, may re-
voke individual exemptions. These actions are usual retroactive.
"Negative clearances" have come into being as a result of Regula-
tion. 17. These clearances permit business concerns to clear any activ-
ity which may be prosecutable under Article 85(1). It should be noted
that while an individual exemption assumes a possible violation of Ar-
34. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY, [EEC TREATY], 29 U.N.T.S. 3.
35. COUSSION ('EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION"), Tim EUROPEAN COMMuNITY COM-
PETITION POUCY (1976).
36. It is interesting to note that, insofar as investigations are concerned, while com-
munications with outside lawyers constitute confidential written communica-
tions, in-house memoranda are not exempt from disclosure nor are
communications with non-EC Counsel. American lawyers, therefore, should be
careful to get licensed by the EC in order to protect their clients and the confi-
dentiality of their documents.
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ticle 85(1), it merely declares its inapplicability under the provisions of
Article 85(3). A negative clearance, however, denies any violation or
potential violation of Article 85(1). In any event, the decisions of the
Commission, or at least summaries of the publication of decisions, are
made public with an effort to avoid undue publicity of possible trade
secrets and other possible harm that might occur to the industry
concerned.
Exclusive dealing methods of distribution have been noted under
Regulation 67, published in 1967, as being one of the first of group
exemptions which were granted because of the rash of publications at
the time of Regulation 17's adoption. Regulation 67 has now been re-
placed by Regulation 1983/83. It is understood that competition law
under the EC rules will not require a manufacturer to compete with
its agents. Therefore, some exclusive dealing arrangements may be
legal and fall outside the scope of the prohibitions of Article 85(1).
The main concern, it would seem, insofar as the EC is concerned, is
the benefits derived by consumers, assuming that the exclusive deal-
ing agreements are themselves beneficial to trade.
It is pretty much established that single firm violations of Article
85(1) do not come within those prohibitions. There must be at least
two parties.3 7 The term "considered practices" is broadly defined as
any kind of informal cooperation between undertakings.
An interesting case involved the French importers of certain parts
made by Grundig outside Consten which had an exclusive arrange-
ment with Grundig.3 8 Consten sued the maverick importer in the
French courts on the basis of violation of French unfair competition
law. The defense was that the Grundig/Consten contract was void
under Articles 85(1) and 85(2). During these proceedings, Grundig
tried to get Article 85(3) exemptions for a host of exclusive dealing
agreements. This is why the Court of Appeals of Paris stayed the pro-
ceedings under French law in the Consten case. The Commission
found the entire agreement to be prohibited by Article 85(1) and de-
nied an 85(3) exemption. The Commission stated that absolute terri-
torial protection in France from the competition of parallel imports of
Grundig products was in violation of the Commission's policy and the
intent of Article 85(1). This decision was upheld by the Court of Jus-
tice because, while Grundig could penetrate the French market by
means of an exclusive retail arrangement, the retailer would not be
37. EEC law defines 'undertaking' as a functionally independent economic entity
which includes profit and nonprofit organizations, partnerships and sole proprie-
torships. This, therefore, excludes agreements between parent corporations and
subsidiaries.
38. Consten and Grundig v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299. This was a vertical re-
straint case and the decision was issued prior to the Commission Regulation 67/
67.
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protected from competition by other Grundig sellers. One item to
note here is that, under the Court of Justice's opinion, absolute terri-
torial distribution rights are not necessary in order to give the protec-
tion or benefits conferred by trademarks. Therefore, a company
cannot exercise its rights under French trademark law by using GINT
(a trade name adopted by Grundig) as a trade and competition barrier.
B. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome
The Rome Treaty is composed of six parts with a total of 250 Arti-
cles. The most important ones for our purposes are Articles 85 and 86.
Articles 85 and 86 are the foundation of EEC competition law. Ar-
ticle 85 prohibits agreements and practices which, directly or indi-
rectly, restrict or distort competition within the Common Market.
Article 86 prohibits abuse of a dominant position by one or more firms,
to the extent that such abuse may affect trade between Member
States. Both articles have been readily enforced by EEC authorities,
producing fines which in some cases have exceeded several million
dollars.
In connection with the prohibitions of Article 85, it is important to
remember that as a rule, relatively extensive market analysis of the
impact of restrictive agreements on competition is the norm. In the
same context it is good to note, in a general manner, that there are
certain "per se" approaches to this analysis.
This "per se" rule of law is basically the substance of Article 86. It
should be noted that under Regulation 17 there are no exemption
powers granted to the Commission as far as Article 86 is concerned.
The law involving dominant positions and affecting the impact of
mergers has been the subject of a number of Commission and court
decisions. One of the most important of these decisions is Europenbal-
late Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission (1972).39
There appears to be a tendency to increase the level of fines on the
European level with respect to antitrust violations, primarily in the
area of horizontal restraints. There may be more enforcement activity
insofar as compliance with the injunctions of Articles 85 and 86 are
concerned.
1. Organizational Structure
The EEC treaty has been implemented by creating the European
Parliament ("Assembly"), the Council, the Commission, and the
Court of Justice. The first of these institutions, the European Parlia-
ment, is comprised of delegates from each Member State. The Euro-
pean Parliament exercises an essentially advisory and consultative
39. Common Mkt. L. Rep. D 11 (Commission; 1973); European Commission Reports
215 (Court of Justice).
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function. With respect to competition policy, the European Parlia-
ment renders advisory opinions, issues advisory reports, and exerts
some influence upon the Commission by way of written and oral
questioning.
The second EEC institution, the Council, consists of one delegate
from each Member State. The Council is the main legislative body of
the EEC. By way of Article 87 of the Treaty of Rome, it is entrusted to
adopt and promulgate appropriate regulations to enforce Articles 85
and 86. However, the Council can only do so after the Commission has
made such a proposal and has consulted with the European
Parliament.
The Commission, which is headquartered in Brussels, has fourteen
members appointed by the Member States. With more than 8,000 em-
ployees, it is the main administrative body of the Community. It is
concerned with the enforcement of Articles 85 and 86. The Commis-
sion has wide powers both of investigation and of enforcement. Its
primary function is to implement and execute Council decisions. In
addition, the Commission has the duty to submit proposals to the
Council, which ordinarily can act only on a proposal from the
Commission.
Finally, the European Court of Justice sits in Luxembourg. It con-
sists of thirteen judges appointed by the Member States. Its role is to
interpret and enforce the competition rules of the EEC, as well as
competition law issues referred to it by national courts. The Court of
Justice is assisted by six Advocates General. The Court's primary
function is to interpret EEC law which includes competition rules. It
has jurisdiction to review decisions taken by the Commission and to
issue preliminary rulings on questions of interpretation relating to
EEC law referred to it by national courts.
2. The Jurisdictional Limits of EEC Competition Law
The jurisdictional scope of the application of EEC competition law
is subject to geographic limitations. Under Article 85, anticompetitive
practices are prohibited only to the extent that they occur within the
Common Market or affect trade between Member States. The same
jurisdictional limits hold true for dominant positions under Article 86.
The test to apply in order to determine whether a practice falls
within the jurisdictional scope of Articles 85 or 86 is unclear. In its
famous Dyestuffs decision, the Commission ruled that such jurisdic-
tional matters may be based on the "effects" a given restrictive prac-
tice produces within the EEC.40 The Court of Justice, however, in a
subsequent appeal, held that it was not necessary to look at "effects"
because the challenged practices had been carried out by foreign firms
40. 1969 J.O. (L 195) 11.
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within the Common Market.4' Thus, although the Court affirmed the
Dyestuffs decision, it is questionable whether jurisdiction may be
based on effects in the absence of conduct within the Common
Market.
Rather, the Commission and the Court of Justice have relied on
the "unity of group" doctrine to justify action against non-EEC firms.
By way of this theory, the Commission and the Court of Justice have
attributed responsibility to non-EEC companies for the restrictive acts
of their subsidiaries within the EEC.42
Therefore, despite the absence of any concrete test of jurisdiction,
arrangements restricting trade between the EEC and third countries
may fall within the scope of Articles 85 or 86.43 As a general rule,
restrictions on import competition entering the Common Market have
been objectionable to the Commission.4 4
Illegal tying in contravention of Article 86 can only be overcome if
the manufacturer demonstrates that its conduct was motivated by
product safety concerns.
The EEC adopted Regulation 2641/84 of the Council of the Euro-
pean Communities (CEC) to strengthen a common European commer-
cial policy in order to protect itself against illegal or unwanted
commercial practices from outside undertakings. As Professor
Zoller45 points out, this is essentially an adaptation of Section 301 of
the United States Trade Act of 1974,46 which gives the President the
authority to retaliate against unfair trade practices of foreign
governments.
We have in the making a substantial body of business competition
law for Europe as a result of the EEC Treaty, the EFTA Treaty and
the bilateral 1973 EFTA-ECC Treaties. It is likely that the future
holds, through a political process, one enforcement system of these
various rules.
41. Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619.
42. E.g., Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R.
215; Case 6/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223; Case 85/76,
United Brands v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461. It would seem that the applica-
tion of this theory is in response to the tendency by the American judiciary to
extend the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws beyond the territorial confines of the
United States.
43. See, The Commission's comments on the "Application of the competition rules to
non-Community undertakings" in ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY,
Nos. 34-42. On cooperation between the Commission and the antitrust authorities
of non-member states see TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPlETITION PoLIcy, No. 157.
44. For a summary of these cases, see Jean-Francois Bellis, International Trade and
the Competition Law of the European Economic Community, 16 COMMON MIKT.
L. REv. 647 (1979).
45. Elisabeth Zoller, Remedies for Unfair Trade: European and United States Views,
18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 227 (1985).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (as amended in 1984).
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3. EEC and National Competition Laws: Their Relationship
The EEC Treaty confers rights and imposes duties upon private
individuals as well as the Member States themselves. Articles 85 and
86 are commonly called "directly applicable" provisions in that they
are among the group of EEC provisions which create rights and obliga-
tions for private individuals.47
As a rule, in an instance where EEC law and the national law of a
Member State are in conflict, EEC law prevails.48 Accordingly, na-
tional courts are required to refuse enforcement of provisions of na-
tional law which conflict with EEC law.49 However, Articles 85 and 86
do not preclude the application of national competition law provided
that the national law does not prejudice application of EEC law.5 0
Not unlike the American assertion of its jurisdiction in trade mat-
ters extending beyond the territory of the United States, the Commis-
sion has also in accordance with the court's rulings, decided that
activities which in one way or another restrict trade between third
countries and the European Community may come within the scope of
Articles 85 and 86.51 The emphasis seems to be that any interpretation
by a national court should not prejudice the full and uniform applica-
tion of Community law or the effects of measures taken or to be taken
to implement it.
The current problem with the competition rules of the Rome
Treaty is that a number of activities are subject to exemption from the
applications of Articles 85 and 86. For our purposes, the more impor-
tant ones are the steel industry and agriculture.
Not all agricultural "associations" enjoy automatic exemption or
special treatment from competition rules under Regulation 26/62 if
they artificially, albeit indirectly, distort competition. 52 The arrange-
ments between European aluminum producers with Eastern Euro-
pean trade agencies to channel aluminum produced in the East
through an EEC intermediary were found, in late 1984, to be in viola-
tion of Article 85(1). This started the trend of finding government
47. See, J.A. Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Dif-
ferent Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425 (1972).
48. Case 6/64, Cost/Enel, 1954 E.C.R. 585.
49. See, e.g., Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Gross-
markte, 1971 E.C.R. 487.
50. Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1 (a landmark case con-
cerning the relationship between EEC and national law). See also Joined Cases
253/78 and 1 to 3/79 Procureur de la Rlpublique and others v. Giry and others,
1980 E.C.R. 2327; Case 73/79, Anne Marty v. Estde Lauder, 1980 E.C.R. 2481; Case
99/79, Lanc8me v. Etos, 1980 E.C.R. 2511.
51. J. Kodow Bentil, Common Market Anti-Trust Law and Restrictive Business
Agreements or Practices Prompted by National Regulatory Measures, 9 EuR.
COMPETrTbON L. REV. 354 (1988).
52. Milchfoerderungsfonds, 1985 O.J. (L 35) 35.
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agencies not to be exempt from conspiracies which might prove harm-
ful to competition.53
Broadly speaking, any agreements which tend to share markets or
allocate quotas which do not in effect promote agricultural productiv-
ity or the standard of living for the European community are not ex-
empt from the applications of 85(1). Of necessity, one can only allude
to general principles.
Now, more than ever, while financial hard times may not be a legit-
imate defense to a finding of anticompetitive practices by an undertak-
ing, it may mitigate the amount of fines imposed. Fines were usually
substantially higher than the fines American companies faced in the
U.S.54
Mergers and acquisitions, of course, have always been of special in-
terest to the French competition authorities, including the Minister of
the Economy and Finance and the Competition Council.
To go into any more detail than has been currently provided here
would be too involved for the purposes of the Article. Many of the
cases have already been analyzed and are reported by scholars and
trade journals.55 One might say, adopting a multitude of caveats, that
the tendency, to put it bluntly, of the European Community is to pro-
tect the European Community. It would seem that trade practices
which would be unfair within the European Community might not
necessarily be unfair when they involve export to third countries. On
the other hand, where the arrangements involve the importation of
products from third countries and tend to distort competition they will
readily be held to violate Article 85(1). For instance, in the relatively
recent Mushroom case in which the French and Taiwanese mushroom
producers had agreed to price fixing and market sharing, the Commis-
sion did not hold them as being exempt,56 even though they might
have fit in the agricultural group exemption discussed earlier.
C. EEC-Enforcement
The powers of the Commission are very broad. They include or-
dering the termination of violations, granting negative clearances and
exemptions and imposing fines.
The term "undertaking" is not defined by the EEC Treaty, but it
seems to refer to almost any legal or natural person carrying on activi-
ties of an economic or commercial nature. A "decision" of the Com-
53. Case IV/27.870, Re: Aluminum Imports From Eastern Europe, 3 C.M.L.R. 813
(1987).
54. John Deere, 1985 O.J. (L 35) 85; Zinc Producers Group, 1984 O.J. (L 220) 27.
55. See, attached bibliography.
56. Case 345/82, Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft GmbH & Co. v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 1984 E.C.R. 1995 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Verwal-
tungsgericht Franldurt am Main).
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mission is binding in its entirety on those to whom it is addressed. A
statement to the effect that, just as the federal system in the United
States puts an end to local state law in the area of competition, so does
Community law put an end to national laws within the EEC, is far too
sweeping. Thus, where local law may derogate from European Com-
munity law, one must distinguish between when the individual states
act in their regulatory activity ("Act of government") and when they
act as parties to a scheme resulting in unfair competition. 57
The EEC competition law, as it relates to consumer warranties,
may be summarized as follows:
1. The manufacturer's warranty that either discriminates against
parallel imports or discourages consumers from purchasing the
product in another Member State violates Article 85(1) because it
has the effect of partitioning national markets. For these reasons,
a manufacturer's warranty offered in the Common Market must
be honored on an EEC-wide basis, with the exception that the war-
ranty need not be honored in a Member State in which a warranty
is not offered by the manufacturer.
2. A manufacturer's warranty that discriminates broadly against an
entire class of retailers, some of whom are necessarily parallel im-
porters, violates Article 85(1).
3. A distributor does not violate Article 85(1) by providing warranty
coverage supplementary to that of the manufacturer's warranty or
by providing other concessions to consumers that are designed to
discourage the purchase of parallel imports, unless in providing
such additional coverage or service the distributor discriminates
against parallel imports in the application of the manufacturer's
standard warranty.5 8
EEC Bloc Exemption 123/85 should not cover franchising rules
which are often arbitrary and anticompetitive in nature.59
For better or worse, the European Community Court seems to fol-
low essentially the basic rules on competition outlined in the U.S.
courts' interpretations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its much
criticized siblings, the Robinson-Patman, the Clayton, and the Federal
Trade Commission Acts.60
57. Giuliano Marenco, Government Action and Antitrust in the United States: What
Lessons for Community Law?, 1 LEGAL ISS. OF EuR. INTEGRATION 1, 9 (1987).
58. Frank L. Fine, EEC Consumer Warranties: A New Antitrust Hurdle Facing EF-
porters, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 379 (1988).
59. See, The Statement of the Retail Motor Industry Federation of the U.K. (RMI),
(Oct. 29, 1985), submitting evidence to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC) which was investigating dual pricing practices in new car prices and selec-
tive distribution practices. 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1540 (Nov. 7,
1991).
60. Richard Whish & Brenda Sufrin, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, 7 Y.B. EUR. L.
1-38 (1988). See Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-
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The Commission's decisions and the EC Court's judgments seem to
be moving in parallel. Both emphasize their attacks on the anticompe-
titive impact of cartels such as sharing markets, coordinating produc-
tion, and price-fixing. Yet, they show considerable flexibility when
facing industry cooperation required in helping problem industries or
promoting economic progress.
The European Commission has been said to lack the motivation to
enforce EC competition rules in areas of shipping. The European
Shippers Council (ESC), the leading shipper's organization, an-
nounced that it would take its case to the European Court of Justice if
the Commission failed to act decisively within the next two months
(by February 1, 1992). The Shipping Conferences which are an au-
thorized cartel for international sea operations should not be allowed
to extend their rate fixing and coordination practices to EC rail and
road activities.6 1
The Commission wants to apply the competition rules as widely as
possible, even in many industries where they have not historically
been applied. These areas include banking, franchising, the dairy in-
dustry and perhaps air transport. At the same time, the Commission
seems willing to be quite pragmatic in permitting cooperation, espe-
cially in sectors like banking which are, in any event, feeling strong
new competitive pressures.
The Commission is showing a similar pragmatism in dealing with
new industries, particularly with respect to cooperation within such
enterprises. At the same time, it seems to be mindful of the relative
weakness of many EEC industries compared to their competitors in
the U.S. and Japan. There is some suggestion that competition policy
may be used to give a helping hand to EEC partners in industrial coop-
eration arrangements.
The question remains of how to apply competition rules to new
fields which have not been charted, such as franchising and know-how
licensing. There may be a trend to interpret less strictly the applica-
tion of Article 85(1) and, thus, reduce the necessity of constant appli-
cations for exemptions under Article 85(3).
The competition rules increasingly seem to involve the automatic
application of specific doctrines to particular types of agreement.
Although this is often done under the theoretical exemption of Article
85(3), the degree of economic analysis in particular cases is relatively
slight. The Court will apparently not be very demanding in requiring
the Commission to make a detailed economic analysis in every case. A
7 (1980); Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27
(1980); Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended by 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(1980). See also Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended
by 15 U.S.C.A- §§ 41-58 (1980).
61. 61 ATRR 1540, at 588 (Nov. 7, 1991).
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rule of thumb may suffice.62
Since 1988, there has been an evident willingness to attack horizon-
tal cartels, even when some of the participants were leaders of the
European industry with close ties to European governments. There
have been fewer reports of cases concerning obstacles to parallel
trade, presumably because fewer suppliers are trying to prevent these
sellers from trading across the frontiers. On the other hand, there are
more cases involving the application of Article 86 where the domi-
nance arises because of an unusual set of circumstances. In such cases,
the Commissioner showed itself able to intervene effectively and
quickly in disputes between business rivals.63
A recent development in EEC law is underfoot. The seven EFTA
countries negotiated an agreement with the EC to create an EEA (Eu-
ropean Economic Area). The EEA agreement, not yet signed, estab-
lishes a nineteen-nation free trade area as of January 1, 1993. EFTA is
to set up a supranational agency, similar to the European Commission,
to enforce rules similar to those of the Treaty of Rome, particularly
Articles 85 and 86. The EEA agency and the European Commission
are to cooperate in all phases in the control of anticompetitive behav-
ior. The EC Commission will continue to be subject to judicial over-
sight by the European Court of First Instance and the European Court
of Justice. However, the EEA agreement creates a new judicial sys-
tem, paralleling the EC system, but made up of EC and EFTA
judges.64
I applaud the September Executive Agreement between the Euro-
pean Community and the United States which provides for coopera-
tion and the sharing of information in the area of antitrust violations.
Given the traditional French position within the EC, which seems to
be that "all i's should be dotted and t's be crossed," it is interesting to
speculate whether this agreement will be implemented without
French and English objections.65
62. I.S. Forester & C. Norall, Competition Law, 6 Y.B. EUR. L. 379-405 (1987).
63. Id.
64. See, 61 ATRR 1540 at 588, (Nov. 7, 1991).
65. In fact, at the writing of this article, the French have filed a complaint on Dec. 16,
1991 with the European Court of Justice in Luxemburg accusing the European
commission of acting ultra vires because it did not follow the procedural route
which, according to the French, it had to follow under Article 228 of the Treaty of
Rome. But, given the German commitment to supervise these enforcement pro-
cedures and antitrust matters, it is doubtful that the French, even with the help
of the British, can overcome the implementation at the EC level of the Executive
Agreement between the U.S. and the EC.
These negotiations are underway within the European Community setting up
a twelve nation bloc unifying the political and monetary practices by the year
2000. When such a unity pact is signed, it will be on a par with the Treaty of
Rome of 1957 in setting the course toward political unification stemming from the
economic unification.
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D. Conclusions
A consumer-oriented policy helps control a free market economy
run amok. Totally free market is incompatible, in the long run, with
competition because it eventually results in a monopoly, or at least an
oligopoly. Much of this can be seen in the airline business where, as
usual, we went from one regulatory extreme to the other.66
The Commission has shown itself able to enhance its own powers
by concentrating energy and resources effectively. In the merger
cases which arose in the summer of 1988, the Commission demon-
strated that it could master the facts and intervene very rapidly.
There is a continued reliance on a detailed legislative text rather
than on generalized principles. Group exemption regulations concern-
ing know-how licensing and franchising were adopted, and the mem-
ber states were under strong pressure to agree to the adoption of the
regulation giving the Commission explicit powers to review mergers.
It is questionable whether detailed legislation is the best means of pro-
ceeding when compared to the adoption of a more realistic general
policy interpretation of Article 85 (1).
In line with the consumer protection concern cited above, the ever-
increasing disparity between the consumers and the traders worries
the EC, particularly the regulators in France and the United Kingdom
who are now aiming at the areas of "unfair" or "sharp" trade promo-
tion practices which affect the poorest segment of the consumer popu-
lation. French and English regulations focus on the disparity in power
between the traders and the consumers, as a recent public statement
indicates that "[b]ehind legislation of this type lies the principle that
the law should recognize certain basic ethical values of society-such
as promoting honesty, openness, and fair dealing, and preventing ex-
ploitation."67 This philosophy, which is shared to a large extent by the
66. It might be well to remember that, historically, the airline industry begged for
regulation in order to survive back in the late 1930s when the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 was adopted under the leadership of American Airlines and my good
friend, Howard Westwood, then a young associate with Covington and Burling.
Then, as is typical with American regulatory agencies, the Civil Aeronautic
Board wound up in the opposite direction, namely that of overregulation. It is a
shame that the Carter administration seemed to think that a simplistic deregula-
tion approval, as advocated by Alfred Kahn, would be the answer to over and
microregulation when, at least to me, the answer lies somewhere in between.
There has got to be some regulation to permit continued competition. Total ab-
sence of regulation results in monopolistic behavior, while overregulation stunts
an industry's growth. This is pretty elementary stuff!
67. Sir Gordon Borrie, the Director General of the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, in a
speech delivered Oct. 22, 1991; see also, 61 ATRR 1540 at 593 (Nov. 7, 1991). What
used to be the underpinnings of American antitrust officials' policy when I served
in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice seems to have been elo-
quently absent in the last twelve years or so in the minds of our competition
officials, possibly with a qualified exception as to the FTC.
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French, should have an impact on EEC competition enforcement.6 8
The adoption of the ECU, the uniform monetary unit under the
European monetary system, sets the stage to an eventual political
union pushed by Germany. To some extent this union is opposed by
France because France wants to retain the national identity of the
members of the Community in the political area. For other reasons,
England also takes a negative position to such a new Europe. Whether
we like it or not, German dominance of the European economy will
undoubtedly eventually prevail, with some modifications and conces-
sions to satisfy the French. By and large, there is less desire, at least
from anecdotal evidence, to make the British happy at all costs. There
is enough feeling among Europeans that while Britain may choose to
stay outside a political alliance in Europe, it will sooner or later have
to join unless it wants to fall between the crevices of the Atlantic
trade. The United States will take the lead, hopefully, to create a
Western Hemisphere Trade Zone. Eventually, it may be possible to
have Europe cooperate with the Western Hemisphere without resort-
ing to any destructive tradewars. At that point, the European and
Western Hemisphere Trade Areas will form a quasi-global trade bloc.
This, in turn, will be the only way to influence the Asian trade policies
to integrate with the world trade bloc on a more realistic and less ag-
gressive basis.
Finally, given the uncertainties brought about by the collapse of
Eastern European bloc and the reluctance of the French and the Brit-
ish to enter into a political federal union in Europe, it would appear
that a single European economic authority is not yet a fact, and cer-
tainly won't be by the end of 1992.
VII. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST POLICY
A. Historical Background of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
The antitrust movement in the United States was first led by the
Grangers. The Grangers, or "Patrons of Husbandry" as they were
called, were founded two years after the American Civil War. Their
goal was to further the social and educational needs of farmers. The
Grangers, however, soon became involved in political and economic
activities. By the mid 1870s, the Grange had reached its height of pop-
ularity. By this time, at least one of every ten American farmers had
68. This consumer concern was also at the core of the New Deal reforms. Curiously
enough, the federal regulatory agencies seemed to have been encouraged by the
Nader consumer activism to abandon their "public interest" stance which was
mandated by their organic statutes. Now the agencies think of themselves as
"judges" in an adversarial proceeding in which counsel for the protagonists fight
to prove their case. This is a departure from the agencies' role which the last
administrations have uniformly applauded, albeit to the detriment of the public!
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been brought within its ranks. Thus, the antitrust movement had
clearly conservative underpinnings.
As the Granger movement grew in popularity, monopolies became
more and more unpopular. Railroads were particularly unpopular. In
fact, the Grangers' anti-monopoly campaign was principally directed
at achieving government regulation of the railroads. The traditional
Granger theme was that monopolies were dangerous to liberty, and
that the only cure was regulation by law. Railroads were considered
to be extortionate and "dangerous to republican institutions."69
The Grangers were succeeded by reformers with much broader in-
terests than railroad regulation. These reformers attacked banks,
public utility companies and other exclusive institutions. But an ever
increasing amount of scrutiny was placed on combinations of indus-
trial firms, which became known as "trusts."
Trusts, it was said, threatened liberty, because they caused govern-
ment corruption, enjoyed protective privileges, drove out competitors
and victimized consumers. The public wanted a law to destroy the
power of trusts. This, of course, was a very broad mandate. The polit-
ical parties recognized the trust problem soon after public sentiment
against trusts began to grow. The major parties did not want to appear
to be the champions of the trusts. The Republican Party, however,
had a particularly compelling need to condemn trusts. Despite a rural
tradition, the Republicans had achieved the reputation of being "the
party of the rich."
Congress began to deal with the trust problem in January, 1889.
An antitrust bill was sponsored by the aging, yet prominent Republi-
can Senator, John Sherman, who wanted to leave one more monu-
ment to himself. Sherman, in a short period of time, began to
establish a sort of personal jurisdiction over the matter. His bill was
not intended to destroy all combinations, but only those which the
common law had always deemed illegal.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, took the antitrust
problem out of Senator Sherman's hands by producing a bill of its
own. The Committee's draft was quite similar to Sherman's original
bill, yet Sherman, out of pride, condemned the bill as being ineffective
in dealing with trusts. However, Sherman voted for it. As a matter of
courtesy, it now bears his name.
The bill passed the Senate by fifty-two votes to one. After subse-
quently passing the House of Representatives, President Harrison
signed the bill. It became law on July 2, 1890.70
On September 26, 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act became
69. PERiAM, Tim GROUNDswELL 286 (1874).
70. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1980).
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law, with the purpose of preventing "unfair methods of trade."71 The
Federal Trade Commission Act was followed by the Clayton Act,
which was enacted on October 15, 1914 "to supplement existing laws
against unlawful restraints and monopolies... ."72 The Robinson-Pat-
man 73 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino74 Acts were added subsequently to
further bolster antitrust enforcement.
B. Antitrust Enforcement in the U.S.
The United States antitrust laws are administered and enforced by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission (the FTC). The Justice Department is unique in
that it alone is charged with the enforcement of the criminal provi-
sions of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Justice Department
or the FTC may enforce the provisions of the Clayton Act. Addition-
ally, the FTC has authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act to enjoin "unfair methods of competition" by issuance of a
"cease and desist" order. Section 5 has been interpreted broadly by
the courts to allow the FTC to move against business practices which
contravene antitrust policy, particularly that of the Sherman Act. In
addition, state attorney generals and private individuals comprise the
third tier of antitrust enforcement in the United States. The Anti-
trust Division of the Justice Department is headed by an Assistant
Attorney General. The Antitrust Division is not only responsible for
enforcing the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but may also intervene in
proceedings before federal administrative agencies involving antitrust
policy.
Violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act may be enforced
in either civil or criminal proceedings. Criminal proceedings can re-
sult in imprisonment of individuals of up to three years75 , while a
criminal fine of $250,000 and a fine of up to one million dollars are
available against individual corporations respectively.76 Over eighty
percent of government cases never go to trial but, rather, are settled
by way of voluntary "consent" decrees or orders.
The FTC is headed by a Chairperson, and the Chairperson, along
with four Commissioners, is appointed by the President, with the ad-
71. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), amended by 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 41-58 (1980).
72. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), amended by 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27 (1988).
73. Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, amended by 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1988).
74. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1394-96,
amended by 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(c)(1988).
75. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act-Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 16 (Supp.
1989).
76. Criminal Fines Enforcement Act of 1984; But see 57 ATRR 458 (1989)(Congress
may increase fines up to $350,000 for individuals and $10 million for
corporations.)
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vice and consent of the Senate. They serve staggered terms of seven
years. No more than three members of the FTC Commission may be
members of the same political party. Commission proceedings are
tried before an administrative law judge. The findings of the adminis-
trative law judge are reviewed by the Commission. The Commission
may either issue a cease-and-desist order or dismiss the complaint.
Appeal from a Commission order may be taken directly to the appro-
priate Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, must ap-
proach the FTC's factual findings with a great deal of deference.
The Antitrust Division has left to the FTC the enforcement of the
price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act. In other
areas of enforcement, there is a substantial overlap in jurisdiction. As
a result, the two agencies have developed a 'qiaison" system in order
to avoid duplicative investigations. Critics of governmental antitrust
enforcement have focused on the deficiencies in policy planning and
case selection at both the Justice Department and the FTC. In sum,
most critics have urged adoption of a more systematic planning policy.
While we should try to normalize the antitrust laws on an interna-
tional level, it would be a good step forward in simplifying our own
antitrust rules and regulatory practices to discourage anticompetitive
trade arrangements within the United States. The fragmentation of
regulatory activities on state and municipal levels is a deterrent only
to doing business within the United States!
Given the decrease in antitrust enforcement by the federal govern-
ment in recent years, a third level of antitrust enforcement has be-
come particularly important. This is enforcement by state attorney
generals and private parties. A state may recover damages which it
sustains directly or it may sue on behalf of natural persons in its capac-
ity as parens patriae. It also may seek injunctive relief without need
of showing damage to its "business or property."77 Moreover, private
parties can seek treble damages, court costs and attorney's fees in ad-
dition to equitable relief.7 8
To constitute a defense under the Sherman Antitrust Act in the
United States, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by the
state acting in its sovereign capacity.79 This means that one must dis-
tinguish between the regulatory activities of government and its
actions in a proprietary capacity engaging in a scheme to impair com-
petition with other parties.8 0
77. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania PMI, 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
78. Under some circumstances foreign governments may also recover treble dam-
ages. See Antitrust Reciprocity Amendment, Pub. L. No. 97-393, 96 Stat. 1964
(1982); Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 304 U.S. 308 (1978).
79. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 412 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).
80. Marenco, supra note 57, at 9.
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In Cantor v. Detroit Edison,81 the Court maintained that it had
"never sustained a claim that otherwise unlawful private conduct is
exempt from the antitrust laws because it was permitted or required
by state law." Next, the court in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mary-
land 82 stated that the "[conflict with the federal antitrust statutes] ...
cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating the Mary-
land statute. For if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of
itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the state's power to
engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed. We are,
therefore, satisfied that neither the broad implication of the Sherman
Act nor the Robinson-Patman Act can fairly be construed as a con-
gressional decision to pre-empt the power of the Maryland legislature
to enact the law."
The proposition that a state system of regulation, as a "state ac-
tion," is not within the reach of the antitrust laws83 is followed by the
Court's holding in California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Alumi-
num.8 4 It held that a state's plan for wine pricing violated the Sher-
man Act because it constituted a resale price maintenance scheme
traditionally held by the Court to illegally restrain trade. One may
assume that the rationale in this case was that prices were being set by
private parties rather than by the state.
So, what happens when a state acts, not in its regulatory capacity,
but rather in a proprietary way like a business? This well-known dis-
tinction in administrative law cases has found its way into the tortured
rationales used by the courts in finding an exemption, or refusing it,
depending on a particular state activity. There are municipal busi-
ness activity cases which hold that a municipality is not exempt from
the reach of the antitrust laws unless there is an adequate state man-
date, meaning that the legislature contemplated the kind of municipal
action complained of.
The see-saw in judicial opinions in this country has, to some extent,
been paralleled in the EC. However, by providing specific exemptions
in the Rome Treaty, the problem is somewhat simplified for the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Many member nations of the EC operate state
monopolies such as ones involving tobacco or liquor which are not, per
se, incompatible with the provisions of Articles 85 and 86.
The Treaty of Rome is the Constitution of the EEC. In comparing
EEC and U.S. law (the Rome Treaty with the reach or impact of the
81. 428 U.S. 579, 600 (1975).
82. 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).
83. New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Fox, 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
84. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). The two-prong test for state immunity enunciated therein was
most recently cited as controlling in Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 775
F.Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1991), relying on the Parker doctrine as cloaking the
local bar associations under the "state action" doctrine.
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Sherman Act), one cannot ignore a fundamental difference. The
Sherman Act hardly rates constitutional deference by the courts. One
would think that when a state runs a business, it should be subjected
to the same strictures as other businesses insofar as the impact on
competition is concerned. Things are not that simple, particularly
when one considers the European tradition of state monopolies in cer-
tain areas. Accommodations are, therefore, made whereby the state
monopoly may market a foreign product either on a license basis or as
sole distributor of the product such as cigarettes.
While the question of state monopolies has not been faced by the
Supreme Court, we do have several cases involving municipal business
activity cases. These cases hold that a municipality is not automati-
cally exempt from the reach of the antitrust laws unless there is an
"adequate state mandate," meaning the "legislature contemplated the
kind of [municipal] action complained of."85
The rationale of requiring a clear state mandate by the legislature
to shield a municipality from the reaches of the antitrust laws has
been confirmed in Community Communications v. Boulder.86 This
case holds that a mere expression of neutrality by the State is not suf-
ficient to make a case for "clear" state mandate. It is of interest to
note that in this case the municipality actually sought to promote
competition!8 7
Pre-emption and exemption are distinct concepts. The former re-
lates to issues arising under the supremacy clause and is rarely found
by the Supreme Court in the absence of a "clear and manifest" con-
gressional mandate.8 8 In contrast, exemption does not involve any
federalism issue.8 9 For want of a rational approach, the whole rela-
tionship between State/Municipal and Federal statutes has been
thrown into a morass of confusion. To that extent, we might benefit
from the adoption of an exemption similar to Article 85(3) of the
Rome Treaty, as adopted by the New French antitrust law.
Finally, to all this is added the confusion generated by the GTE
Sylvania case.90 This case ruled that a manufacturer may restrain
85. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394 (1978).
86. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
87. In the Boulder case, the municipal regulation was designed to enhance competi-
tion, an exemption specifically recognized by the EEC Treaty. The rather clumsy
response to Boulder by the U.S. Congress has been the adoption of the Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Act of 1984 [98 Stat. 2750 (1984), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36
(1988)] which has needlessly complicated the issue by permitting overzealous
state legislators to enact legislation which purports to decide the reach of the
federal statute. One glaring example is that of the Illinois legislature, not known
for its forward-looking policy, rushing to enact Public Act No. 83-929, passed in
Nov. 1983.
88. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
89. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
90. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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competition with its own product (e.g., vertical/intrabrand com-
petition).
C. Conclusions
One would think that the United States would focus more actively
in the proliferation of cartel-like activities that have been relatively
undisturbed here in the last ten years or so. It would seem to me that
certainly the European Community, the United States including Can-
ada, at this point, and, hopefully, the Western Hemisphere in the fu-
ture, should enter into agreements to supervise the activities of
cartels.
I hate to belabor the point, but I believe commercial law in the U.S.
should be federalized.91 It makes no sense to have fifty diverse inter-
pretations of antitrust laws which are not only federal but also state
laws. The proliferation of self-annointed private attorney generals is
not in the best interest of the consumer or, for that matter, the
businessperson.
Since 1984, case law has done little to instill any respect for the
domestic reach of the antitrust statutes. One former antitrust attor-
ney-general in charge of the Antitrust Division under the Reagan Ad-
ministration declared in a private discussion at an ABA Section
meeting that since the division did not think that the strict enforce-
ment of antitrust statutes was very productive in a vital and competi-
tive free-market, it would try to refrain from prosecuting cases that
are best left to the private sector. The rationale in his statement was
that private treble damage suits should be sufficient to inhibit anti-
trust violations by industry. There goes the current United States en-
forcement of antitrust laws!
Whether this type of thinking, which was fashionable during the
years of the Reagan administration, will continue into the 1990s and
beyond is something to watch for in the future. My own crystal ball is
too cloudy to let me prognosticate at this juncture.
The EEC rules are similar to Parker v. Brown's92 dictum, which
provides that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it by declaring that their
action is lawful." However, the EEC experienced a similar flux in en-
forcement to that of the United States.
The EEC Court of Justice has not ruled that a state legislation was
incompatible with the EC Rules on Competition even when the activ-
ity affects corporate decision-making because the Court of Justice has
ruled that anticompetitive state legislation does not come within the
91. Rodolphe de Seife,A Plea for the Creation of Commercial Courts, 17 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 437 (1982).
92. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
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parameters of Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty. A Member State
in its economic regulatory capacity does not violate either Article 85
alone or in combination with Article 5.93
Pre-emption is in the wind, particularly with more reliance in the
terms of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome that Member States "shall
abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of
the objectives of the treaty." What sort of regulations would then fall
within the prohibition of Article 85?
A partial answer to that question is that the EEC has adopted a
differentiation between regulatory and business activity,94 going along
with Parker's second dictum now repudiated in the U.S. The EEC po-
sition is even clearer since the Cognac case.95
As pointed out elsewhere in this article, it is likely that within the
next five years all, if not most, European countries including the vari-
ous members of the former Soviet Union will have joined such a Euro-
pean entity. At such time, it will present a formidable market with
over 350 million people as opposed to the 250 million between Canada
and the United States. This is one more reason why the United States
should push its foreign trade policy towards a Western Hemisphere
trade association even though, with all the countries in South
America, the Western Hemisphere will barely match the European
market. I would foresee then, once this is done, a normal fusion and
cooperative agreement between the Western Hemisphere market and
the European market. It should be obvious that adversarial fights be-
tween the European and the Western Hemisphere would constitute
economic suicide. It is absolutely essential for American businessper-
sons to replace the short term thinking of so-called "bean counters"
and "bottom line" executives and replace it with a long term view of
what the future holds.
The Council on Competition is in many ways similar to our Federal
Trade Commission. Again, the idea of using excess agricultural sup-
plies to feed the world's poor, rather than spend additional tax monies
to store food which eventually rots, is something that should be ex-
plored. It would, at least for the time being, provide an answer to
what up to now has been done by national subsidies. While, in a sense,
we still would be talking about subsidies these would be via a United
Nations agency which would buy these goods at world market prices
for distribution to starving nations.
The ruthless competition of greed which is benefiting the top non-
involved executives has to be restructured to incorporate some mini-
mal social concerns. These concerns include respect for pension sys-
93. Marenco, suprm note 57.
94. See, Case 41/83, Italian Republic v. Commission, 31 E.C.R. 873 (1985); Case 55/83,
Italy v. Commission, 31 E.C.R. 683 (1985).
95. Case 123/83, BNIC v. Clair, 1985 E.C.R. 402.
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tems and minimal welfare concerns of the workers who participate to
a limited extent in the future of the company. The obscenity of multi-
million dollar executives who bankrupt a corporation, put thousands
of people out of jobs, and then use their golden parachutes to land
another job in another company in which they have no personal
vested interest, enabling them to bankrupt, with impunity, that com-
pany as well, is one of the reasons why we are not doing well in our
international competition. The adversarial relationship between man-
agement and labor has to be replaced by a cooperative spirit which
benefits all. There must be some kind of loyalty that goes from the
management to the workers in order to elicit some reciprocal loyalty
from the workers to their companies. Having elevated greed to the
rank of national virtue coupled with the American myth of adminis-
trative and executive infallibility for the past dozen years, we must
reevaluate our national priorities. This includes our ability to compete
in the domestic as well as the global marketplace. This means that we
have to cease blaming others for our shortcomings and, consistent
with our free-trade philosophy, find ways to improve our competitive
position without reducing our country to a Third World status by the
unabashed exploitation and downgrading of our work force. I, for one,
do not believe that by being reduced to excel in what I call a "pimp-
ing" economy (read "service" economy), we can compete successfully
in the World Market.
VIII. GATT
A. Introduction and Overview
In February of 1946, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council resolved to hold an international conference on trade and em-
ployment matters which would draft a convention establishing an In-
ternational Trade Organization (ITO).96
A preliminary draft of the Convention was produced by the Pre-
paratory Committee, which met in London in 1946 and Geneva in
1947. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment was
held in Havana from November, 1947 to March, 1948. It adopted the
text of the Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO).97
In addition, the conference established an Interim Commission for the
ITO (ICITO), consisting of fifty two countries. ICITO set up an Exec-
utive Committee which met several times. By 1950, however, it be-
came clear that the Havana Charter was not going to be accepted by
96. Much of the historical background has been culled from McGovERN, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE REGULATION §§ 1.11-1.14 (2d ed. 1986).
97. The text of ITO document is known as the "Havana Charter." See U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PuB. No. 3117 (1947).
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the United States. Accordingly, all efforts to establish the ITO were
abandoned.
During the interim, however, members of the Preparatory Com-
mittee, along with several other countries, engaged in tariff negotia-
tions amongst themselves. On October 30, 1947, twenty-three
countries signed an act authenticating the text of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).98 The text contained detailed
provisions for acceptance of GATT but these were not used. Rather,
the eight principal participants in the negotiations9 9 concluded a Pro-
tocol of Provisional Application,10o by which they agreed to apply
GATT subject to various conditions.
The GATT imposes four principal obligations on the contracting
parties: (1) to accord most-favored-nation status to other parties in
respect to most other areas of trade regulation; (2) to observe maxi-
mum tariff levels; (3) to limit the use of non-tariff trade barriers; and
(4) to make special procedures for dispute resolution. The General
Agreement does not address the issue of institutional arrangements
because the document was intended to be a transitional instrument.
Instead, institutional arrangements were left to future development.
Besides the General Agreement, there are over 160 principal constitu-
tive texts of GATT.
The most notable of GATT's activities have been the eight so-called
"rounds" of negotiations which have been held to-date: Geneva (1947);
Annecy (1949); Torquay (1950); Geneva (1956); the Dillon Round
(1960-61); the Kennedy Round (1964-67); the Tokyo Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations (beginning September 1986) and the cur-
rent Uruguay Round.101 The first six "rounds" were aimed at
reducing tariff levels. Each succeeded in the adoption of new sched-
ules of tariff concessions. The Kennedy Round was the first to extend
its scope beyond tariff questions. Following the wake of the Kennedy
Round, the Tokyo Round was the first to seek the elimination or re-
duction of non-tariff barriers to trade. The Tokyo Round led not only
to traditional tariff reductions, but also to the adoption of various sep-
arate "codes."102 The most recent of the rounds, the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, has been stalled but now appears
98. McGovern, supra note 96, citing 55 U.N.T.S. 194; T.LA.S. 1700.
99. These "principal participants" included Belgium, Canada, the Republic of China,
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
100. Geneva Protocol, Oct. 30, 1947, in force Jan. 1, 1948; McGovern, supra note 92,
citing 55 U.N.T.S. 308, B.I.S.D. IV/77, T.I_.AS. No. 1700. According to the McGov-
ern Treatise, the countries which have joined GATT after January 1,1948 may be
regarded as having joined the arrangement constituted by the combination of the
Protocol and the General Agreement.
101. See, Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 19
The Uruguay Roun&k Where Are We?, 25 INT'L L. 723 (1991).
102. Some, but not all, GATT contracting parties subscribed to these codes. Code top-
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to be reviving. While no agreements have been concluded at this
round, it is hoped that Member Nations 03 will come to a resolution on
several troublesome international trade issues. The most troubling of
these issues include the so-called "agricultural" and "intellectual
property" problems.
B. GATT: Free Market/Unfair Competition-U.S. and EEC Positions
1. The Agricultural Problem
The agricultural problem can be traced back to the 1951 U.S. Dairy
Quotas case in which the United States Congress' 04 breached the
GATT General Agreement by imposing illegal quotas on dairy prod-
ucts. GATT proceedings were initiated a month later in order to se-
cure removal of the illegal quotas. Direct enforcement failed. In 1955,
the United States secured a waiver' 05 exempting its agricultural re-
strictions from GATT. The dairy quotas, together with other U.S. ag-
ricultural trade restrictions, are still in effect today.
The list of other countries in breach of GATT rules continued to
grow into the late 1950s and early 1960s. Even members with liberal
trading policies, such as the Scandinavian countries, sought exemption
for certain agricultural products.106
The breakdown in enforcement of agricultural trade involved a
GATT rule which was itself a compromise to the principles of free
trade. The draftsmen of GATT had assumed that member nations
would manage and support agricultural prices vis-a-vis protective pric-
ing. Accordingly, Article XI:2 of GATT was drafted to allow for pro-
tective price-supports. Governments, however, were required by
GATT to limit domestic production to that of the import market
share.
As indicated above, this rule broke down. In order to satisfy farm
income goals, a large quantity of agricultural production was required.
These large quantities of production invariably generated tremendous
surpluses. In turn, governments were forced to dump the surpluses on
the export market at prices below the prevailing market price. As
could be expected, large agricultural surpluses and dumping activity
created hostility between member nations. Accordingly, many na-
ics included, for example, use of subsidies and countervailing measures, anti-
dumping standards, and government procurement.
103. There are currently approximately 100 Contracting Parties to GATT.
104. According to at least one expert, the U.S. Congress can be regarded as GA r's
"archenemy" during the early years of international trade negotiations. ROBERT
E. HUDEc, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DniLomAcy 181 (2d ed.
1990).
105. For terms of the waiver, see B.I.S.D. 3rd Supp. 32, 141 (1955).
106. In fact, when the Europe Free Trade Area (EFTA) as organized in 1959, agricul-
ture was wholly excluded from the commitment to remove trade barriers.
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tions, including the United States, instituted trade barriers violative of
the GATT General Agreement with respect to agriculture.
The EEC's highly protectionist Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) created another hurdle for GATT in the area of agricultural
trade in the early 1960s. Through CAP, the EEC instituted a new type
of trade barrier called the "variable levy," a floating customs duty
which guaranteed that tariffs paid by importers would be higher than
the uniform price supports paid to all EEC farmers. In short, the EEC
claimed complete autonomy over agricultural trade policy. 0 7 Despite
a multitude of negotiations between the U.S. and the EEC, the "varia-
ble levy" is still in full force today. Thus, given current EEC policy
and the host of agricultural exemptions discussed above, GATT's en-
forcement powers in the area of agriculture are aptly described as
negligible.
2. The Intellectual Property Problem
As with agriculture, chronic problems exist in the area of intellec-
tual property rights. The intellectual property problem centers
around the unintended transfer of technology from the economies of
the industrialized nations to the economies of developing and newly
industrialized nations.108 Intellectual property is "intangible wealth."
Without safeguards, it is easily appropriated and reproduced. In fact,
losses to United States industry alone have been estimated to be as
high as $61 billion per year. 0 9
In industrialized countries, intellectual property rights are pro-
tected by patent, copyright, trademark and a variety of other types of
legislation. Such legislation does not exist, or is not enforced, in many
developing or newly industrialized countries. Therefore, the intellec-
tual property solution centers on devising a mechanism for protecting
the industrialized nations' intellectual property rights within the
lesser developed countries. Without such a mechanism, the develop-
ing and newly industrialized countries will continue to reap a windfall
at the expense of the industrialized world.
The GATT is virtually silent as to intellectual property issues. The
first effort to bring the issue to the forefront of GATT negotiations
was made by the United States during the Tokyo Round in the late
107. Much of this portion of the introduction was from Professor Hudec's excellent
book, supra note 104.
108. Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellec-
tual Property Negotiations in the GA2'T Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 697 (1989). Most of this portion came from this excellent
article.
109. Id.; see also, note 24, at 700, citing U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, PuB. No. 2065,
FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFEcT ON
U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988).
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1970s. 11o However, it was not until 1986 that the United States, with
support from the European Communities, persuaded the full GATTI
membership to include the Uruguay Round Ministerial Declara-
tion"'l, a mandate for negotiations on trade-related aspects of the in-
tellectual property problem.
As a result of this mandate, a GATT working group on trade-re-
lated aspects of intellectual property (TRIPs) was established. On Oc-
tober 28, 1987, the United States presented to the TRIPs working
group a proposalll2 for GATT intellectual property agreement. This
proposal contemplated the use of a separate GATT code as the means
of implementing an intellectual property framework. It also provided
for an independent GATT dispute resolution mechanism to settle in-
tellectual property conflicts. However, the United States' proposal
was not adopted by GATT.113
3. Progress of the Uruguay Round and Possible Outcomes
The GATT Secretariat and the various trade ministers held a
Midterm Review of the progress of current negotiations in December
1988 in Montreal. The review was successful to the extent that the
ministers became more deeply engaged in the substance of the negoti-
ations. However, the ministers where unable to conclude the Midterm
Review on schedule or reach agreement in several subject areas, in-
cluding agriculture and intellectual property. Equally disappointing is
that the Brussels Ministerial, hosted by the European Communities
from December 3-7, 1990, was plagued by stalled negotiations. The ag-
ricultural group, in fact, never began earnest negotiations.114
C. Conclusions
With the growth of mega-transnational corporations and multina-
tional conglomerates having only a national flag for convenience pur-
poses, it becomes necessary to envision antitrust regulation on a more
global scale. Thus, the recent executive agreement by the United
States to cooperate in the area of merger and acquisitions with EC is a
good thing!
110. Abbott, supra note 109, citing at 712, note 72; GLicK, MULTMATERAL TRADE NE-
GOTIATIONS 41, 126, 152 (1984); A. Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, In-
vestment and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations,
23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 64 (1987).
111. Sept. 20, 1986.
112. U.S. Framework Proposal to GATT Concerning Intellectual Property Rights, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1391 (1987).
113. In response to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the United
States has also undertaken direct bilateral negotiations coupled with the threat of
unilateral economic sanctions.
114. See, Bello and Hudec, supra notes 101 and 104, respectively.
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Based on these events, it appears that little progress will be made
in the agricultural area, unless Germany convinces its EC partners to
become somewhat more flexible on the government support issue.
While the Uruguay Round is replete with disagreement, no area has
proved more troublesome than agriculture.115 Moreover, the United
States is likely to insist that its current agricultural restraints remain
in place."16 Thus, it appears highly unlikely that the Agriculture Ne-
gotiating Group will reach any significant agreement.
On the other hand, negotiations on the intellectual property issue
have engendered a great deal of optimism. Debate continues in the
GATT Working Group on trade-related intellectual property (TRIPs)
on a variety of macro, as well as micro, issues. In fact, the TRIPs
agreements appear likely to become the principal achievement of the
Round for the industrialized countries. Given the recent United
States "fast track" 7 extension and an indication by the German gov-
ernment advocating some flexibility on agricultural issues, agreement
on some of the issues discussed above appears more hopeful."8 With a
little luck, one may expect an agreement to be struck and negotiations
concluded in the not-too-distant future.
Article 24 of the GATT which is to facilitate trade among GATT
factions, clashes with the Treaty of Rome. This in a sense creates bar-
riers between the EC and the rest of the world. The EFTA Treaty of
1959, bringing Britain into the European sphere, seemed to close the
gap with Article 24. Britain eventually joined the ECC after De
Gaulle's resignation removed France's veto. EFTA is a continuing en-
tity. Its treaties bind its signators with the EEC. Articles 65 and 66
articulate the rules governing competition in the Coal and Steel Com-
munity by "enterprises" as defined by Article 80.
While the Paris Treaty of 1957 aims at maintaining competition
and condemns any activities which might distort, directly or indi-
rectly, such competition, it permits the authorization of certain agree-
ments and activities (upon clearance by the Commission). This
authorization is allowed for a limited time period and is subject to rev-
ocation, following a determination that the activities: (1) are designed
115. The agriculture issue has been met with worldwide resistance. The U.S., EC, Jap-
anese, Korean, Latin American, and South American negotiators have all come to
an impasse on the issue.
116. These restraints, include, but are not limited to peanuts, sugar, and dairy
products.
117. Under the United States Constitution, the President does not require authoriza-
tion from Congress to enter into trade negotiations. However, as the Uruguay
Round agreements will require U.S. implementing legislation, the President is
dependent on congressional support. With the "fast track" procedures, Congress
has agreed in advance to vote promptly (within ninety legislative days) on any
implementing bill submitted by the President.
118. Negotiations in the area of tariff reduction also appear to be fruitful.
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to improve the coal and steel production and distribution, (2) do not
exceed the bounds necessary to achieve this result, (3) do not permit
the unilateral exclusion of price, production of a substantial percent-
age of the products involved, and (4) do not prevent effective competi-
tion in the coal and steel market.
GATT's objective to create a positive free market atmosphere
around the globe is not ascertainable at this time. It then becomes
readily apparent that GATT's efforts will be substantially hampered
by an ineffective regulation of anticompetitive practices by trader na-
tions. If it is true that in order to have a free market one must have
free competition, it is equally true that unregulated free markets and
competition inevitably result in monopolies, at worst, and in oligopo-
lies, at best, particularly in the basic industries. It is, therefore, imper-
ative that measures be adopted on a multilateral basis to ensure that
commercial practices which distort competition and impede the free
market are not allowed to flower.
This, in a nutshell, is the thrust of the various antitrust and unfair
competition laws in the United States, Canada, the EEC and its mem-
ber states. A cooperative approach to implement these laws to ensure
an effective regulation of anticompetitive practices is necessary.
There are some signs that such a cooperation among the United States
and the EEC is indeed being implemented.119
IX. U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: QUO VADIS?
A. Background and Overview
A survey of the effects of the new French competition law and its
place in the context of French economic policy, as well as its possible
impact, in conjunction with German, U.K. and other European domes-
tic laws, on the decisions by the European Community must be taken
into consideration by American International Trade planners. To al-
low the European Community to wind up as a competitor instead of as
an ally would constitute a monumental failure of U.S. Trade diplo-
macy. In my opinion, President Bush missed a golden opportunity to
reinstate the United States in its leadership role by suggesting, in his
recent European tour, that NATO be converted into an economic
union instead of clinging to outmoded thinking in terms of military
defense! The lack of vision by this administration is appalling. It has
119. At press time, a special ABA Committee, chaired by Professor Barry E. Hawk of
Fordham, issued a draft report recommending substantial changes to harmonize
U.S. law with that of its trading partners. I have only had an opportunity to read
the report cursorily and find myself to be in complete agreement with its sum-
mary recommendations. A copy of the two-volume report may be obtained from
the ABA at a cost of $50. The Introduction and Recommendations have been
reprinted by BNA's Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report of Feb. 6, 1992.
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not seized the opportunity to promote the free market doctrine by
convincing our European allies to consider an economic union to be at
least as important, if not more important, than a military union.
Ironically, what is saving the American foreign trade outlook, at
least to some extent at this point, is that European competition, by and
large, will be slowed down by domestic problems created by the down-
fall of the Soviet regime and the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe,
creating unprecedented social and economic problems for the hereto-
fore prosperous European nations. This is not unlike the experience
of this country with the uncontrolled influx of millions, often "un-
documented," aliens who have little understanding of the host coun-
try's political philosophy and social policy. It will take a number of
years for an orderly integration of these new social forces to be com-
plete, with sometimes very painful episodes. Both the United States
and the "new" Europe will emerge as somewhat different from the
western countries to which we have grown accustomed. In Europe,
the political orientation may not be quite as "pro-American" as it was
before, regardless of the billions of dollars we are pouring, or talking
about pouring, into the recovery of the newly liberated nations. Once
the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the community is finished
and some modicum of economic affluence is restored to those parts,
then the "new" Europe will represent a formidably competitive
adversary.
It will be up to our politicians and businesspersons, assuming that
they are wise and astute enough, to create a cooperative free market in
which Europeans and Americans will work side by side to create a
better world.20
B. The Impact of U.S. Antitrust Laws on GATT
It is axiomatic that by removing government barriers to free trade,
monopolization will occur, unless there is some regulation of the "free
market" forces. Therefore, this calls for regulation of the market, pri-
marily to ensure that the very same barriers to trade formerly created
120. Why is it not possible to create an international agency which would buy-at free
market prices-agricultural products to be distributed to the World's starving
masses? Farmers (at least I am told by my friends) may think that subsidies are a
form of charity- this would avoid any such stigma. I would support that Third
World regimes be forced to devote their scarce resources to buy food for their
people before being allowed to spend billions on armaments. The current expend-
itures for arms by Third World countries is obscene. See, eg., WORLD MIuARY
AND SOCIAL ExPENDrruREs, (1987-88 12th ed.) and (1991 14th ed.), World Priori-
ties, Inc., Washington, D.C.; Michael Gartner, Military costs are high-in lives,
dollars, missed opportunities, USA TODAY, July 9, 1991 ($880 billion spent for
military in 1990); and George D. Moffet I, THE CHRmSTIAN SCIENCE MoNrroR,
Apr. 24, 1992.
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by governmental entities are not now re-erected by private businesses
to the detriment of the consumers.
Congress, which is closest to the people, may be tempted, for short-
term domestic political reasons, to enact legislation designed to protect
its constituents against what is perceived as inimical foreign trade
practices. With elections always around the corner, it is difficult for
the House to act in a statesmanlike manner except in true national
emergencies. The Senate is only slightly more removed from these
constraints but is even more subject to the influences of moneyed lob-
bies, as was experienced in the rash of S&L scandals. This is why one
would hope that the Executive would assume its legitimate leadership
role and create a foreign trade policy that it could persuade Congress
to adopt for the benefit of the American people as a whole. Thus, the
propensity of Congress to legislate on a spur-of-the-moment approach
is often noxious to the long-range economic health of the nation. The
constant threat by members of Congress to arrogate to themselves the
constitutional prerogative of conducting foreign affairs, which in-
cludes trade, is not a good omen for the future. Congress does not
trust the GATT to do the job and winds up, given half a chance,
micromanaging the various trade agreements.
By the same token, the adversarial stance by the Executive vis-a-
vis Congress is not healthy for this country either. The top people are
riddled with personal conflicts. One begins to wonder, sometimes,
whether the so-called Foreign Trade Policy benefits the nation or the
best-heeled lobbyists with access to the moneyed corporate executives
on loan to the Executive Branch. In a broader sense, one could say
that the Executive, on the whole, favors a fairly traditional free mar-
ket concept based on reciprocity unless, for reasons which are un-
fathomable, it chooses not to apply the reciprocity rule or seems to
play favorites with the "most favorite nation" rule, such as it does with
China (apparently to be "feared") or Russia (which can be made to
jump through hoops and be patronized).
Turning to the question of whether arbitration has a broader role
to play in the future, it does us well to remember that, under the EEC
rules, private claims of damages are left to the national courts. Arti-
cles 85 and 86 are quite clear on that issue. However, Article 85(2)
provides a basis for private claims-to be heard by the national
courts-by stating that agreements which violate antitrust laws of the
Treaty of Rome are void and unenforceable.
As noted, the EEC Commission enforces decisions by decrees. The
European Court of Justice (ECJ), in turn, usually deals with alleged
anticompetitive arrangements in line with its jurisdiction over appeals
from Commission decrees. It is good to note at this point, that actions
in which the Commission, on behalf of the EEC, is a party are not
arbitrable.
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The United States Supreme Court may also question whether leav-
ing cases involving antitrust claims exclusively in the hands of arbitra-
tors is compatible with the public policy aims of American antitrust
laws. In Mitsubishi121, the court assumed that arbitral tribunals
would apply the U.S. antitrust law if it were rational to do so. The
court indicated that if the arbitrator read the choice of law clause to
mean that Swiss law was to be applied, totally displacing United States
law, even where it would otherwise apply by virtue of the statute, it
would deem such an award unenforceable as against public policy.
Determining when American antitrust law will apply "otherwise"
is difficult in an international context. I believe that an arbitrator ap-
plying Swiss law would probably follow American antitrust laws more
readily than many American courts. Although Articles 85 and 86 of
the EEC Treaty contain important and far-reaching substantive anti-
trust provisions, they do not address arbitrability. Moreover, arbi-
trability is not a concern of EEC law in general. Nevertheless, the
problem of the arbitrability of antitrust claims under EEC law should
be resolved.
To achieve any of the reforms needed for the survival of a coopera-
tive European and Western Hemisphere trade activities, we must im-
plement an intensive and rational objective education policy both
domestically and with our trade partners. Individuals within these
trade blocs have to be given viable alternatives which preserve both
domestic and GATT objectives. For a period of time, it seems that
subsidies will have to be permitted, but not in random fashion. Rather
than directing the trading nations in a hostile expansion of trade
within a fierce competitive adversarial stance, these subsidies should
be tolerated and turned into positive channels to enable the individual
farmer to survive, whether in Europe, the United States, Canada or
Mexico. It will be a long time before nationhood is abolished, if ever.
The economic backbone of any nation is its farmers and real goods
producers.
With the demise, real or imagined, of the ideological and political
East-West conflict, we still face the so-called North-South confronta-
tion. This is a potentially lethal conflict between the have and the
have-not nations.
It might be beneficial to revisit the spirit which led to the drafting
of International Trade Organization Charter at the Havana Confer-
ence in 1948. Must we dismiss the concept which led to the creation of
the International Monetary Fund (IVIF) or the World Bank fund to
promote global trade and commercial policies?
As pointed out by Professor Zoller, remedies which are unilateral
and poorly designed to combat unfair or illicit trade practices of for-
121. 473 U.S. 614 (1984).
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eign states have a negative impact on GATT today.122 This is the ad-
versarial stance that one would hope could be overcome in order to
ensure cooperation between the United States, its Western Hemi-
sphere partners and the Europeans within the EEC.
The fact that the Commission of the European Community feels
that section 301 of the United States law is "potentially inconsistent"
with provisions of the General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) did not prevent the Commission from claiming that it has
achieved a middle ground between section 301 and GATT by the crea-
tion of an exhaustive list of illicit or unfair practices. This, of course,
is an unattainable objective. Despite some semantic differences be-
tween the European regulations and section 301 of the United States
Trade Act of 1974, the results achieved by both pieces of legislation are
the same. Both are unilateral and adversarial. They are operative
without a prior breach, or international noncompliance, by a foreign
state having occurred.2 3
The solution may well lie in regional and inter-regional coopera-
tion. The Western Hemisphere trade bloc and European trade bloc
could cooperate rather than competing for markets on this planet.
The type of organization, be it GATT, a resurrected ITO or some
other similar international or inter-regional mechanism, is of great
importance to the Midwest farmer. The fact that the North American
continent constitutes the bread basket of the world (akin to the role of
Egypt in the days of the Roman Empire!) makes it imperative that a
free market and a free trade approach to feeding the world be
maintained.
As a major grain exporter, we must keep our roads to international
trade clear of interference and petty parochialism. This means, how-
ever, that we also have to cooperate with the farmers in Canada and
elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Aside from farm products,
there are the dairy products and meat areas to be considered. Beef
exports from Argentina must be encouraged in order to get that na-
tion back on its feet. A method has to be found which will permit
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and the other Latin American countries, as
well as Canada and the United States to cooperate rather than com-
pete. This is not possible without some kind of government manage-
ment of agricultural trade. On a broader scale, before a viable
Western Hemisphere Trade bloc can be created, we must see that local
122. Zoller, supra note 45.
123. Commission Regulation 2641/84 (CEO) of 17 September 1984 was designed to
strengthen a common European commercial policy to protect the community
against illegal or unwanted commercial practices.
This is essentially an adaptation of section 301 of the United States Trade Act
of 1974 giving the president authority to retaliate against unfair trade practices of
foreign governments. See, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1974)(amended 1984).
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wages in the impoverished countries are raised to a level substantially
equivalent to our own so as to prevent the exploitation of the working
masses for the benefit of a few greedy individuals.
By the same token, the same process will be implemented in Eu-
rope. For the time being, the 1992 time fuse has been defused because
of the problems brought about by the integration of East Germany
into the New Germany, for instance. There are sufficient problems
for the EEC partners to mull over for the next few years to try to
integrate the rest of eastern Europe. In the short run, this means that
1992, to some degree will be nowhere as formidable, as was feared by
many Americans for several years. However, within the next ten
years or so, if we do not find a method of cooperating, the European
trade bloc will present such a formidable entity that it would become
the single most powerful economic power on this planet. It could al-
most dictate its terms to the rest of the trading nations. This, in turn,
will result in protectionist isolationism. In the long run, we will have
lost the economic battle by becoming involved in costly and suicidal
trade wars. The resulting world-wide depression would make the De-
pression of the 1930s look like a picnic!
A bridge has to be built between the European and the Western
Hemisphere blocs. Since the people of these two blocs have every-
thing in common including their core cultural heritage and legal sys-
tems, I should think that ways might be found for reasonable people
within these blocs to cooperate to the benefit of the people in both
blocs rather than to engage in a suicidal economic warfare. Between
the European bloc and the Western Hemisphere bloc, there would be
unlimited possibilities to eventually bring in Japan and the Pacific
Rim along acceptable terms, and ultimately the Third World. Addi-
tionally, the periodic hunger and famine which devastate whole conti-
nents, such as Africa, and cause the starvation of millions of innocent
people could be alleviated, if not prevented. Such starvation is an ob-
scenity in a World where excess food and other basic goods are pro-
duced and wasted!
This, of course is predicated, to some extent, on the premise that
we secure promises from governments in developing countries to
adopt forms of government which are not inimical to their own people.
Otherwise, these continents will just drain from the Western Hemi-
sphere and the European bloc resources which are badly needed
within the blocs themselves. This is something that the people in the
developing Third World, wherever located, must realize. Of course, it
must be noted that within the two major economic blocs, the Euro-
pean bloc and the Western Hemisphere bloc, there are "Third World"
countries which have to be brought up to par before these two blocs
can worry about bringing the rest of the world to quality levels of
existence on a par with the industrialized world.
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X. CONCLUSION
It is ironic that the American businesses which thrived and the
American private enterprise system which prospered under the tenets
of the antitrust laws which regulate competition have abandoned the
laws which they caused to be enacted during the economic hard times
of a hundred years ago. We seem content to let things happen and
somehow hope to repair them, in the near and maybe not-so-near fu-
ture on an ad-hoc basis. We still stalk the globe as if we were number
one in all areas and as if the money in our coffers were plentiful. This
is patent wishful thinking. Surely, a country that has billions to dis-
tribute around the world and yet does not find it possible to spare mil-
lions to save its own cities and its own farmers has misplaced
priorities. The old adage of taking care of oneself before taking care of
others is irretrievably intertwined with ensuing economic policies.
This notion seems to have escaped the American planners of interna-
tional trade politics, while it is something that the Europeans do not
forget.
The European nations learned some time ago that there was some-
thing to be said for certain types of economic regulations such as tough
antitrust laws, particularly when they affect the domestic consumer.
Thus, the Treaty of Rome Articles 84 and 85 laid the ground work for
economic policy designed to gain primacy for Europe and the interna-
tional markets while at the same time trying to spare the domestic
consumers as much grief as possible.
To some extent, the talk about free trade as if it were a reality, and
the free market as if it were really in existence, creates a strange envi-
ronment for a successful and vital economy. National economies have
been managed ever since people of an organized society started trad-
ing with their neighbors. Things have not changed all that much in
1991. To a great extent, the economy is still being managed despite
protestations to the contrary by our leaders. The only difference these
days is that very often our economy is managed to the detriment of the
American investor and consumer for the immediate monetary advan-
tage of a small clique of self-seeking money-hungry business piranhas
who have no personal stake in the businesses they run and put their
short-term private interests ahead of those of the nation.
The downfall of the Soviet Regime's hegemony over Eastern Eu-
rope is creating unprecedented social and economic problems for the
prosperous European nations, not unlike our experience with the un-
controlled influx of millions of Third World immigrants. It will take a
while for integration to be completed. It will be painful both here and
in Europe. Once incorporation of Eastern Europe in the European
Community is accomplished and some modicum of economic affluence
is restored to those parts of Europe, the European Community will
represent a formidable and awesome competitive adversary. Whether
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our politicians and businesspersons are wise enough to create a coop-
erative market in which Europeans and Americans are going to be
working side by side to create a better world remains to be seen.
Questions concerning the rising Pacific powers remain. Japan, Tai-
wan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore are already the key
players in that area. Australia and New Zealand find themselves in
the middle between the Western and Asiatic blocs. To some extent,
this affects the French Pacific Territories (Tahiti, New Caledonia,
French Polynesia) and our own fiftieth state, Hawaii.
One would think that the so-called Pacific "Rim" will use Austra-
lia and New Zealand as a bridge to meaningfully communicate with
the Western Hemisphere. India, the Philippines, and South East Asia,
as a whole, represent enormous opportunities for economic expansion
for everyone's benefit if the nations learn to play by cooperative rules
designed to create a "kinder and gentler" "New World Order," bor-
rowing the current rhetoric of our political leaders.
I have chosen France as an example of a totally managed economy
trying to break out of the political cocoon created by the World War II
cataclysm to the more recent times when it embraced a form of (albeit
managed) free market economy. This economy was created by the
adoption of the 1985 Law on Competition and the December 1, 1986
Decree and Ordinance.
A relatively complete, if brief, survey of the effects of the new law
and its place in the context of French economic policy assessing its
impact on the European national laws on competition, particularly on
how it may affect decisions by the European Community of which the
European nations are becoming more and more an integral part, is in
order. Will the modest French effort in creating this new competition
law have an impact on the European community and, in a broader
sense, on the world economy, possibly through the positions taken by
Europe during the various GATT negotiations which will continue to
take place? Never before has it been more important for Americans
to realize that the world is, in fact, a global village and we must par-
ticipate actively in the running of the village before that village runs
us and maybe not to our pleasing, as many have predicted.
President Bush missed the opportunity to urge the transformation
of NATO into an Economic Trading area. It is a shame. The Europe-
ans, somewhat patronizingly, have allowed the U.S. to remain on as a
mercenary force to be used against some shadow enemy. This is not
our proudest moment. We can, and indeed we must, do better!
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